Nova Southeastern University

NSUWorks
CEC Theses and Dissertations

College of Engineering and Computing

2010

Early Detection of Online Auction Opportunistic
Sellers Through the Use of Negative-Positive
Feedback
Gregory J. Reinert
Nova Southeastern University, greinert@comast.net

This document is a product of extensive research conducted at the Nova Southeastern University College of
Engineering and Computing. For more information on research and degree programs at the NSU College of
Engineering and Computing, please click here.

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons

Share Feedback About This Item
NSUWorks Citation
Gregory J. Reinert. 2010. Early Detection of Online Auction Opportunistic Sellers Through the Use of Negative-Positive Feedback. Doctoral
dissertation. Nova Southeastern University. Retrieved from NSUWorks, Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences.
(285)
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/285.

This Dissertation is brought to you by the College of Engineering and Computing at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in CEC Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

Early Detection of Online Auction Opportunistic Sellers
Through the Use of Negative-Positive Feedback

by
Gregory J. Reinert

A dissertation report paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Computer Information Systems

Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences
Nova Southeastern University
2010

We hereby certify that this dissertation, submitted by Gregory J. Reinert, conforms to
acceptable standards and is fully adequate in scope and quality to fulfill the dissertation
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____________________________________________
Maxine S. Cohen, Ph.D.
Chairperson of Dissertation Committee

________________
Date

_____________________________________________
Francisco J. Mitropoulos, Ph.D.
Dissertation Committee Member

________________
Date

_____________________________________________
Sumitra Mukherjee, Ph.D.
Dissertation Committee Member

________________
Date

Approved:

_____________________________________________
Leonidas Irakliotis, Ph.D.
Dean

________________
Date

Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences
Nova Southeastern University
2010

ii

An Abstract of a Dissertation Report Submitted to Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Early Detection of Online Auction Opportunistic Sellers
Through the Use of Negative-Positive Feedback
By
Gregory J. Reinert
November 2010

Apparently fraud is a growth industry. The monetary losses from Internet fraud have
increased every year since first officially reported by the Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3) in 2000. Prior research studies and third-party reports of fraud show rates
substantially higher than eBay’s reported negative feedback rate of less than 1%. The
conclusion is most buyers are withholding reports of negative feedback.
Researchers Nikitov and Stone in a forensic case study of a single opportunistic eBay
seller found buyers sometimes embedded negative comments in positive feedback as a
means of avoiding retaliation from sellers and damage to their reputation. This category
of positive feedback was described as “negative-positive” feedback. An example of
negative-positive type feedback is “Good product, but slow shipping.”
This research study investigated the concept of using negative-positive type feedback as a
signature to identify potential opportunistic sellers in an online auction population.
As experienced by prior researchers using data extracted from the eBay web site, the
magnitude of data to be analyzed in the proposed study was massive. The nature of the
analysis required - judgment of seller behavior and contextual analysis of buyer feedback
comments – could not be automated. The traditional method of using multiple dedicated
human raters would have taken months of labor with a correspondingly high labor cost.
Instead, crowdsourcing in the form of Amazon Mechanical Turk was used to reduce the
analysis time to a few days and at a fraction of the traditional labor cost.
The research’s results found that the presence of subtle buyer behavior in the form of
negative-positive type feedback comments are an inter-buyer signal indicating that a
seller was behaving fraudulently. Sellers with negative-positive type feedback were 1.82
times more likely to be fraudulent. A correlation exists between an increasing number of
negative-positive type feedback comments and an increasing probability that a seller was
acting fraudulently. For every one unit increase in the number of negative-positive type
feedback comments a seller was 4% more likely to be fraudulent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Problem Statement and Goal
Willie Sutton the bank robber was asked why he robbed banks, his reported reply was
"Because that's where the money is" (Sutton & Linn, 1976). In a similar case of
criminals following the money, the 2009 IC3 Internet Crime Report found a 22% percent
increase in Internet fraud complaints compared to 2008 (2009 Internet crime report,
2010). IC3 reported that monetary losses from Internet fraud increased over 210% rising
from $264,600,000 in 2008 to $559,700,000 in 2009. The IC3 report found incidents of
online auction fraud dropped to fourth place in the rankings for 2009, but still composed
a significant 10.3% of the total monetary complaints. EBay – the largest online auction
service – does not publicly release the total number of items listed for auction. A thirdparty vendor Medved that monitors eBay shows over 4,000,000 new listings per day are
added to the over 106,000,000 active lists on eBay website (Medved, 2010). Even with
thousands of eBay staff members monitoring the website around the clock; it is not
possible to find all the potentially fraudulent auctions and immediately shut them down
("Consumer reports survey of eBay users," 2007).
An opportunistic seller is someone who attempts to negate online auction safeguards
and exploit buyers for monetary gain. The exploitation is commonly manifested as
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criminal activity in the online auction environment. Specifically it is exhibited in the
forms of fraud, theft, and identity stealing (impersonating another user to shield criminal
activity). Of these, fraud is the most prevalent (2009 Internet crime report, 2010).
Online auctions differ from traditional brick-and-mortar auctions. At a traditional
auction, the bidder has a chance to examine the items up for auction. The auctioneer is a
live person who controls the bidding. Identity of the bidders, buyers, and sellers is easy
to ascertain. Online auctions are vulnerable to fraud more than are brick-and-mortar
transactions due to increased information asymmetry between sellers and buyers
(Kauffman & Wood, 2000). Online transactions rarely involve face-to-face contact;
payment is made before goods can be inspected; repeat transactions between seller and
buyer are unusual (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002); and no word-of-mouth reputation for
the seller is available. Word-of-mouth is the most credible, objective, and influential
means for exchanging feedback information and building trust since this type of
communication among impartial buyers is unlikely to be biased or profit-driven (Kamins,
Folkes, & Perner, 1977).
In order to compensate for these uncertainties, online auctions like eBay have
instituted feedback systems that facilitate the collection and dissemination of information
about seller past transaction behavior (Dellarocas, 2003a). By making publically
available information about sellers’ past transactions, an institutional feedback
mechanism facilitates buyers’ trust and reduce the risk from the community of sellers
which enables buyer-seller transactions (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). It is the culmination of
feedback from buyers in prior transactions that builds the seller’s reputation in an online
auction.
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A differentiator between online and traditional auctions is the type of reciprocity used.
A traditional auction relies on direct reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were
trustworthy with me before.” An online auction relies on indirect reciprocity as in “I trust
you because you were trustworthy with others before.” In both cases past trustworthiness
is a prerequisite for future transactions. It is the information about reputation that enables
trust by inducing a reciprocal response (Dellarocas, 2006; Hendershott, 2006). Any
undermining of the provided feedback’s validity or absence of negative feedback distorts
the seller’s reputation and potentially exposes future buyers to exploitation by an
opportunistic seller.
It is not easy to get feedback from buyers. Research on eBay’s feedback system shows
buyers submits ratings on 41.8% to 52.1% of all transactions (Gregg & Scott, 2006;
Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; Wood, Fan, & Tan, 2002). Buyers may not be motivated to
report evaluations or to do so honestly. In a case where the seller’s capacity to provide a
service or goods is limited, then it is not in the buyer’s self-interest to make the
information public. An example is a serious collector’s reluctance to reveal a source for
rare items. Buyers who want to be seen as “nice” may withhold negative evaluations in
expectation of reciprocity. A seller’s threats of retaliation for negative feedback
combined with explicit or implicit offers of rewards for positive feedback might lead
buyers to submit reports that do not accurately reflect their experience. Clearly these
factors are in effect as negative feedback for sellers by buyers on eBay occurs in less than
1% of all transactions (Zhang, 2006). This contrasts with the substantially higher fraud
rates reported to external entities like the National Consumers League Internet Fraud
Watch; suggesting buyers are hesitant to leave negative evaluations ("Watch out for
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cyber scrooge this holiday season," 2006). When an eBay buyer does give negative
feedback, the seller gives negative feedback 34% of the time which indicates that
retaliation may be occurring (Miller, Resnick, & Zeckhauser, 2003).
On eBay for each transaction the buyers and sellers can opt to appraise the other party
by leaving feedback. Feedback consists of a positive, negative or neutral rating with an
optional short comment ("What is feedback and how does it affect my reputation?,"
2010). The ratings are used to determine a member’s Feedback Score. With some
exceptions - feedback works like this:
• A positive rating increases the feedback score by one point.
• A neutral rating leaves the feedback score the same.
• A negative rating decreases the feedback score by one point.
Feedback score is a number used to measure a member's reputation on eBay. A high
feedback score means that a member has received a high number of positive ratings from
other members. Every member of eBay has a feedback score. It can be found in
parentheses next to their eBay userid (see Figure 1). Identifying information was redacted
in this and other figures to protect the privacy of the eBay members.

Figure 1. eBay Feedback Score

Clicking the feedback score enables access to a member's detailed Feedback Profile (see
Figure 2). This includes recent feedback ratings, detailed seller rates, and feedback
(rating plus optional comment) for each transaction with other members.
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Figure 2. eBay Member Feedback Profile

Feedback is publically viewable immediately after it is posted by either party. Neither
party can change a feedback rating after it has been posted. There are very limited
circumstances when eBay will consider allowing a change or removing a feedback rating
and/or comment based on the eBay Feedback Abuse policy ("Feedback abuse," 2010).
Sellers and buyers are able to hold feedback hostage by refusing to leave feedback until
the opposite party has provided a report. For fraudulent transactions, this behavior could
result in false feedback reports or no feedback provided altogether based on fear of
retaliation (McDonald & Slawson Jr., 2002). Thus important information to the online
auction community about the seller’s behavior can be lost.
Inexperienced eBay members are probably oblivious to the threat of feedbackretaliation, but members who are experienced with online trading are sensitive and
protective of their reputation. Experienced members consider the possibility of retaliation
and take this into account when they make their decision of what feedback type to
provide. Other than the possibility of feedback-retaliation exactly why a buyer should
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care about feedback is not obvious. It is too simple to assume that buyers remain buyers
forever as most eBay participants switch back and forth between the role of buyer and
seller. A buyer has to be sensitive to feedback because it may effect future income as a
seller. Sellers with higher ratings (better reputations) are able to sell products at a higher
price then sellers with lower ratings (Bajari & Hortacsu, 2003). Buyers with a good
reputation will not risk finding their bids cancelled due to a low feedback score. Negative
feedback can have an adverse effect not just on the seller, but on both parties.
Studying online auction deception is problematic when using conventional methods as
with other deviant behaviors the successful perpetrators work hard to avoid detection.
The degree of difficulty is compounded by the findings of Zhang (2006) that eBay
buyers provide 99% positive comments and 0.7% negative comments. As prior research
studies and third-party reports of fraud show rates substantially higher than the 0.7% rate
reported, the conclusion can easily be drawn that most buyers are opting to withhold
reports of negative feedback. The absence of negative feedback is problematic as it
suggests a positive bias in feedback scores. This bias is borne out with the empirical
observation that most eBay sellers have a reputation feedback scores that exceed 99%.
Therefore analysis of numerical feedback scores for detection of opportunistic sellers is
futile.
Building on the base issue of fraud, the research problem statement can be
summarized as:
Online auction fraud represents a serious threat to e-commerce and undermines online
trust. As fraud is pervasive, growing in use, and difficult to detect in online auctions;
new techniques are needed for the early detection of opportunistic sellers.
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Excluding the use of feedback scores in online auctions for the detection of
opportunistic sellers raised the following issues:
•

Are there other signatures that could potentially identify deception in an online
auction transaction?

•

Can a new method be developed for the detection of opportunistic sellers by utilizing
one of these signatures?

•

For any new signature – What are its limitations and predictive reliability?
An extensive forensic case study by Nikitov and Stone (2006) focused on modeling

the behavior, attributes, and deception tactics of a single opportunistic seller who traded
for eight years on eBay. Based on one of the case study findings, the concept of
“negative-positive” type feedback appeared to be a candidate for a new signature to
detect opportunistic sellers. The viability of the potential new signature along with
determining its limitations and predictive reliability needed to be investigated; this
investigation served as the premise for the research study.
Because of confidentiality rules, it was not possible for the Nikitov and Stone (2006)
to acquire the case study’s subject member data directly from eBay. Instead, publicly
available data from the eBay website was gathered – transactions, feedback ratings,
feedback comments, and seller replies (to buyer feedback comments). This was
supplemented by e-mail surveys and follow up interviews with buyers who had interacted
with the seller. The researchers acting anonymously in the role of buyer performed
multiple transactions purchasing items to collect additional data on the seller’s behavior.
Nikitov and Stone (2006) findings confirmed the lack of negative feedback by buyers
even after having a problematic or fraudulent experience with an opportunistic seller. The
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majority of sellers obliquely or explicitly stated fear of feedback-retaliation (i.e. tit-fortat) as the reason for not leaving negative feedback on the seller. Several buyers (in
escalated situations) indicated that the seller implied retaliation in e-mails should any
complaint be made. Buyers that made negative feedback almost universally received
retaliatory negative feedback from the seller. The most frequent response employed by
the opportunistic seller to any communicated question or complaint was to use deception
tactics to disarm, confuse or place the buyer on the defensive (see Figure 3). The
deception tactics used were concealment strategies (masking, repackaging, dazzling, and
red flagging) and simulation strategies (mimicking, inventing, decoying, and doubleplay) (Johnson, Grazioli, & Jamal, 1993).

Figure 3. Example: Seller Using Decoying Deception Tactic in Response to Negative Feedback

The most interesting result from the forensic analysis of the opportunistic seller was a
new discovery about buyers’ feedback data (feedback rating and feedback comment).
Nikitov and Stone (2006) found buyers sometimes embedded negative comments in
positive feedback as a means of avoiding feedback-retaliation. They referred to this
category of positive feedback as “negative-positive” type feedback. The concept of
negative-positive type feedback is best understood by viewing a side-by-side comparison
of positive, negative and negative-positive examples.
This is an example of a typical positive feedback from a buyer (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. eBay Sample Positive Feedback From Buyer

This is an example of a typical negative feedback from a buyer (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. eBay sample negative feedback from buyer

This is an example of a typical negative-positive feedback from a buyer (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. eBay Sample Negative-Positive Feedback From Buyer

Nikitov and Stone (2006) found that negative-positive feedback postings contained
hidden signals to the buyer community about a problematic or fraudulent seller. The
composition of negative-positive feedback included both positive and negative aspects of
a transaction. Negative-positive complaints were usually in the formats of “I was pleased
with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction” or “I was unhappy about Y, but was
pleased with X for the transaction.” Typical examples are “Good product, but slow
shipping” and “Took 7 days and 2 messages before replying to my email, but product was
well packaged.”
In their forensic analysis, Nikitov and Stone (2006) viewed negative-positive feedback
as a hidden signal to the buyer community about a seller; utilizing feedback content
analysis they were able to expose indicators that the seller was potentially problematic or
fraudulent. Their research was limited to performing in-depth forensics analysis of a
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single opportunistic seller. The concept of using negative-positive feedback as a signature
to identify potential opportunistic sellers in an online auction population was never
explored. This gap provided a narrowly scoped and tightly bounded area for research
with a goal of the early detection of online auction opportunistic sellers through the use
of negative-positive feedback. How to measure the success of using a negative-positive
signature for indentifying opportunistic sellers is a little more problematic due to eBay
confidentiality rules. The implications of this problem are explored in the Methodology
chapter along with a verification rationale and implementation techniques.
Feedback-retaliation has been explored as noted in prior citations by a multitude of
academic research studies since the inception of eBay in 1995 (Bolton, Greiner, &
Ockenfels, 2009; Dellarocas & Wood, 2008; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002). The buyers at
eBay have been vocal on issues about feedback policies through direct e-mail
communication to the company and postings on discussion boards. In January 2008, eBay
responded by announcing a fundamental change to the feedback system. Sellers could
leave only positive or neutral ratings for buyers. That means buyers were free to leave
negative feedback without fear of feedback-retaliation (Ambach, 2008).
Logically, buyers should have responded by providing negative feedback when
appropriate. Although the new policy has been in effect for over two years, the status
quo remains – eBay still reports less than 1% negative feedback; most members have a
99% or higher feedback rating; and the percentage of fraudulent transactions continues to
rise (Gregg & Scott, 2008). Obviously the number of opportunistic sellers is increasing
and buyers are still reluctant to provide explicit negative feedback. From this the
conclusion can be drawn that buyers are continuing to use negative-positive feedback as a
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means to signal the community about potentially opportunistic sellers. Ergo the ideal for
early detection of online auction opportunistic sellers through the use of negative-positive
feedback remains viable even under the modified feedback system.
Relevance and Significance
Understanding and identifying occurrences of online deception is critical for
increasing participation in online auctions and other forms of e-commerce, as victims of
fraud will leave the online auction market and potential new customers withhold
participation based on fear of becoming a fraud victim (Nikitkov, 2006; Pennington,
Wilcox, & Grover, 2003).
Investigating online deception is important as deception in any form is the enemy of
trust and some degree of trust is required for all business transactions (Grazioli &
Jarvenpaa, 2000). Opportunistic sellers use deception tactics to create an illusion of
trustworthiness to the buyers’ detriment. A goal of this research study was to help online
buyers and online auction vendors to identify sellers who are unworthy of their trust.
According to the Federal Trade Commission, the number of consumer complaints
about online auctions has been growing annually. Their latest report indicated that 89%
of all Internet fraud complaints filed by the National Consumers League are related to
online auctions ("Online auction fraud complaints still rising, says consumer watchdog,"
2004). Losses due to fraud in online auctions range in the hundreds of millions of dollars
annually. As with most type of frauds, a significant amount of fraudulent activity is never
reported by the victims.
The size of the online auction market is immense, but difficult to pin down to a
specific figure as many are privately held. An idea of its scale can be drawn from eBay’s
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2009 SEC Annual filing showing an income of $8,727,362,000 ("Form 10-K for eBay for
2009," 2010). The 2009 IC3 Internet Crime Report found a 22% percent increase in
Internet fraud complaints compared to 2008 (2009 Internet crime report, 2010). IC3
reported that monetary losses from Internet fraud increased over 210% in the same time
period rising from $264,600,000 in 2008 to $559,700,000 in 2009.
Barriers and Issues
No matter how successful the research study for early detection of opportunistic
sellers, efforts to deter fraud by developing new detection techniques function like a new
military stratagem. The advantage will shift back and forth between the offense and the
defense, depending on the adoption of new behaviors and technologies driven by how
much each side gains if it wins.
Detection of negative-positive feedback by buyers required the examination,
interpretation, and categorization of each buyer’s feedback comment text. As natural
language communications are variable in form, subject to contextual use, can be
incomplete, and prone to errors in spelling and/or grammar; it was necessary to transpose
the relevant written text into a formatted and coded structure. A coded structure provides
data uniformity and enables automated analysis. Normally, the difficulty is designing an
appropriate structure to capture all the components that could be found when performing
the contextual analysis (Krippendorff, 1980). In this case, the design of the structure was
greatly simplified by use of just two categorical codes. The absence of negative-positive
feedback in a buyer’s feedback comment text was coded as N (No). The presence of
negative-positive feedback in a buyer’s feedback comment text was coded as Y (Yes).
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Studying online auction deception is problematic as with other deviant behavior the
successful perpetrators work hard to avoid detection. An opportunistic seller will employ
deception tactics in order to mask his/her behavior and illicit activities. These deception
tactics will include the use of concealment strategies (masking, repackaging, dazzling,
and red flagging) and simulation strategies (mimicking, inventing, decoying, and doubleplay) (Johnson, et al., 1993). Although the objective of deception tactics is concealment
or misdirection, the presence of deception tactics was used to advantage. The primary
mode of communication between buyer and seller in an online auction is via written text.
This text can take the form of internal correspondence - feedback comments and replies
to feedback; or external correspondence via e-mail. Detecting the seller’s usage of
deception tactics by examining the written texts provided corroborating evidence
supporting the identification of a potential opportunistic seller found by using a negativepositive signature. The textual communications were in natural language format with
complex overtones and subtle nuances which precluded any easy method for
representation in a coded structure. Automated textual analysis currently has limited
capabilities and significantly less than a 100% rate of accuracy (Hijikata, Ohno,
Kusumura, & Nishida, 2006; Lee, Jeong, & Lee, 2008). Therefore, processing of these
types of textual communications required human review and interpretation. Reducing the
subjectivity of interpretation required evaluation of each communication by multiple
reviewers and creation of evaluation rules for uniform results.
Because of confidentiality rules, it was not possible to acquire data directly from eBay
on any members. Mimicking the actions of Nikitov and Stone (2006), publicly available
data from the eBay website was gathered – transactions, feedback ratings, feedback
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comments, and seller replies (to buyer feedback comments). It was possible to automate
the mechanics for the data gathering process by using a spider-like program to crawl the
eBay website and extract publicly available data. This technique has already been used
successfully by multiple prior researchers (Almendra & Schwabe, 2009; Lucking-Reiley,
Bryan, Prasad, & Reeves, 2007; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; Zhang, 2006).
In a court of law the degree of difficulty and legal criteria to prove that a specific
fraudulent action was performed is less than proving intention as in “intent to defraud.”
Similarly developing a new method which shifted through prior transactions to identify
potentially fraudulent activity that had occurred was significantly easier than attempting
to predict fraudulent intent for items being offered in auction. Most opportunistic sellers
for practical reasons employ a long-term strategy of exploiting multiple buyers over an
extended period of time, rather than use a one-time “take the money and run” strategy
(Nikitkov & Stone, 2006). Two practical reasons are the increasing level of difficulty in
setting up a new eBay userid and the time required to establish a “good” reputation. In
order to deter fraud, eBay has continued to tighten the verification requirements for
creation of new eBay userids and has improved detection of attempts to create multiple
userids by one person. Therefore the new method took advantage of historical
information and was forensic rather than predictive in design. Even when using a
forensic method, definitive labeling of an online auction member as an opportunistic
seller was not possible. This was because confirmation was not available from the
sources with authority – eBay or court rulings. What could be stated was that the specific
member exhibited the behaviors and actions characteristic of an opportunistic seller and
therefore had a high probability of actually being an opportunistic seller.
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Definition of Terms
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) - A crowdsourcing system in which requesters post
Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) then workers do the HITs, submit the results, and
receive a small payment ("Amazon Mechanical Turk," 2010).
Buyer – A member who buys an item from a seller using the online auction ("eBay
glossary," 2010).
Category Listings – Items are organized by placement into predefined categories,
subcategories, etc. Example category: Computers and Networking ("eBay glossary,"
2010)
Feedback - For each transaction a buyer/seller can choose to leave an opinion about the
other party’s performance for the transaction. Feedback is composed of two parts – a
rating (Feedback Rating) and an optional text comment (Feedback Comment). A rating
can be positive, negative or neutral ("About feedback," 2010).
Feedback Comment – It is part of Feedback consisting of an optional text comment
("About feedback," 2010).
Feedback Profile - A webpage that shows all of a member's information – Feedback
Score, Feedback Rating, Feedback Comments, list of items sold, etc. ("About feedback,"
2010)
Feedback Rating – It is part of Feedback consisting of a rating which can be positive,
negative or neutral ("About feedback," 2010).
Feedback Score - Feedback score is a number (from zero to infinity) used to measure a
member's reputation on eBay based on the total number of previous sales or purchases
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that were given feedback by the other party ("eBay feedback scores, stars, and your
reputation," 2010).
Feedback Type – Also know as Feedback Rating. It can be positive, negative or neutral
("About feedback," 2010).
Feedback-Retaliation - Negative feedback that is left in response to negative feedback
from the other party (Nikitkov & Stone, 2006).
Fraud - Any act of deception carried out for the purpose of unfair, undeserved and/or
unlawful financial gain. This term has been broadened for the purpose of the study as
when the seller imposes a cost on the buyer for which other potential buyers should be
aware of when considering purchasing from that seller (author).
Gold Standard Data - Collection of preselected data that have a known set of answers
produced by one or more individuals who are trusted and a domain expert (Sorokin &
Forsyth, 2008).
Human Intelligence Test (HIT) - A task that a human requester asks a human worker to
complete that is simple for a human to do and inherently difficult for a computer to do
("Amazon mechanical turk requester best practices guide," 2010)
Member – A person who has created a profile on the online auction website. A member
has a userid and password for providing secure access to the online auction functions like
buying or selling, review or leave feedback, or updating personal information ("eBay
glossary," 2010).
Negative-Positive Feedback – The use of embedded negative comments in positive
feedback by a buyer as a means of avoiding retaliation from the seller (Nikitkov & Stone,
2006).
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Online auction – Is a business model in which members bid for products and services
over the Internet. Example: eBay (Bajari & Hortacsu, 2004)
Opportunistic seller - A person who attempts to negate online auction safeguards and
exploit buyers for monetary gain (Nikitkov & Stone, 2006).
Reputation – The culmination of feedback that a member receives in an online auction
(Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006).
Seller – A member who sells an item using an online auction ("eBay glossary," 2010).
Transaction – Either a sale or purchase made by a member ("eBay glossary," 2010).
Userid - A unique moniker or name used to identify a member of the online auction.
Most online auctions allow the person to choice his/her own userid ("eBay glossary,"
2010).
Summary
Researching online auction deception is problematic as with other deviant behavior
the successful perpetrator works hard to avoid detection. An opportunistic seller will
employ deception tactics in order to mask his/her behavior and illicit activities. The
research study investigated if the presences of subtle buyer behavior in the form of
negative-positive type feedback comments are an inter-buyer signal indicating that a
seller is behaving fraudulently.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Reputation Systems
The corpus of this research concentrates on two areas of literature. The first is
asymmetric information and second is reputation system design. Asymmetric information
is a situation in which the seller knows relevant information about a product that the
buyer does not know (Akerlof, 1970). This creates an imbalance of power in transactions
which can sometimes cause a transaction to go awry (adverse selection) or make a buyer
reluctant to risk engaging in a transaction (moral hazard). Reputation systems are used in
online communities when a member has no prior knowledge or experience interacting
with another member. In this type of situation, it is often helpful to make a decision
whether or not to interact with a member based on the prior experiences of other
members. Reputation system design as the name implies is the process of creating
appropriate mechanisms to enable a reputation system to function effectively.
Asymmetric information regarding products or sellers has a major impact on market
exchange which can result in a market collapsing or failing (Kauffman & Wood, 2000).
Reputation and reputation mechanisms play an important role in reducing information
asymmetry. These mechanisms facilitate buyer’s trust and reduce the risk from the
community of sellers which enables buyer-seller transactions (Levine & Martinelli,
1998).
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Each of the two asymmetric information models takes into consideration adverse
selection and moral hazard. Reputation mechanisms have different roles in each of the
two models. For adverse selection the role of a reputation mechanism is in helping the
community to learn the initially unknown character (i.e. honesty) of a member
(Dellarocas, 2003b). In a moral hazard setting, the objective of reputation mechanisms is
promoting cooperative and honest behavior among sellers and buyers by the threat of
future punishment (Shapiro, 1983). As Cabral (2004) stated, typical reputation
mechanism models that incorporate reputations are based on Bayesian updating of
beliefs. In other reputation models trust is modeled through repeated interaction and by
the possibility of punishing inappropriate actions in a moral hazard setting (Diamond,
1989).
In an online auction, a reputation system is the primary means to induce sellers and
buyers to behave cooperatively. A reputation system’s mechanism enables future buyers
to condition behavior on a seller's current actions. A reputation system can work as a
feasible and less costly substitute for legal enforcement for online auctions (Bakos &
Dellarocas, 2003). A reputation system serves as a proxy for the transactional history that
would be developed between buyers and sellers over the succession of repeated
interactions (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002).
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) demonstrated the problems of low feed-back rates and
potential reporting biases. Based on their work other researchers proposed mechanisms to
solve these problems. One technique employed a monitoring mechanism. Ba, Whinston,
and Zhang (2002) suggested a Trusted Third-party (TTP) mechanism which entailed
issuing certificates to sellers and buyers. Dellarocas (2003b) proposed charging a listing
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fee contingent on a seller's announced expected quality then rewarding the seller based on
the announced quality compared to the posted rating by the buyer. Both mechanisms
were designed to discourage sellers from lying about the true quality of a product.
A second mechanism design attempts to promote honest behavior and facilitate online
auction transactions between sellers and buyers through peer-provided feedback. Miller,
Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005) proposed a peer-prediction technique by comparing the
likelihood assigned to a reference rater's possible ratings to the reference rater's actual
rating. Jurca and Faltings (2007), Papaioannou and Stamoulis (2005), and others
proposed reward and punishment systems that induced both sellers and buyers to report
truthfully. Two drawbacks to the feedback concept is failure of peers to respond
truthfully and positive bias caused by the missing negative feedback as in Dellarocas and
Wood (2008).
The third kind of mechanism accounted for the missing reports through a
computational mechanism. Dellarocas and Wood (2008) designed a sophisticated
computational mechanism to remedy distortions introduced by reporting bias. Their
mechanism required buyers to take missing feedback into consideration.
A reputation system must meet three challenges. First, it must provide information
that allows buyers to distinguish between trustworthy and non-trustworthy sellers.
Second, it must encourage sellers to be trustworthy. Finally, it must have a mechanism to
discourage participation from those who are not trustworthy (Resnick, Kuwabara,
Zeckhauser, & Friedman, 2000). A number of empirical studies of eBay’s reputation
mechanism have been conducted almost entirely focused on buyers’ response to
published feedback. Multiple studies have estimated the regression of sale prices based
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on seller feedback characteristics. Surveys containing these results can be found in Bajari
and Hortaçsu (2004) and Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood (2006). The
contributing factor of these studies is their tangential remarks about negative feedback –
lack thereof, effects on sellers, effects on buyers, hints about retaliation, etc.
Analyzing eBay’s imperfect reputation mechanism has been the subject of much
research. McDonald and Slawson (2002) noted that eBay’s reputation system revealed
only a portion of a member’s private information due to some members’ unwillingness to
provide feedback. eBay members have little incentive to leave feedback once a
transaction has been completed and often they do not bother to do so. Members have
incentives not to provide negative feedback when appropriate for fear of retaliatory
feedback.
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2004) created a basic theoretical model of eBay’s reputation
mechanism that featured both adverse selection and moral hazard. Their model suggested
when in equilibrium a seller’s reputation was positively correlated with seller effort
(honest sellers rewarded and opportunistic sellers punished). The authors’ model also
suggested that sellers, specifically opportunistic sellers, had incentives to "buy" a
reputation by engaging in purchases rather than sales. Cabral and Hortaçsu also noted that
eBay’s feedback system though functional was not optimal.
Feedback
Feedback comments from an online auction should be viewed as a narrative-textual
representation of a user’s reputation. A single feedback type rating cannot capture all the
information about a transaction as the impressions of buyers and sellers are typically
nuanced. Assume for the moment that there are two buyers - one only moderately
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satisfied regarding the purchase and another buyer ecstatic. Both buyers would normally
select positive for feedback type because the transaction would have been perceived as
positive. The feedback type of positive does not truly capture the essence of the
transaction. A better understanding of the experiences of the buyers could be found by
examining the text of their feedback comments. For example – moderately happy Buyer
A might write “Product OK, but delivery slow.” While the ecstatic Buyer B might write
“Great product and shipped fast!” With a traditional numerical reputation system, Buyer
A and Buyer B would be deemed identical in terms of their purchasing experience which
not the case. Research into feedback comments provides insights into online auction
transactions (Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006).
Prior research for online auctions include studies focused on the buyer response to
published feedback. The interaction of sale price with buyers’ feedback types and
feedback comments has been reviewed by multiple researchers including McDonald and
Slawson (2002), Melnik and Alm (2002), Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), and Resnick,
Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood (2006). Whether quantitative aggregate summary
ratings (feedback score), feedback type (i.e. negative, positive or neutral) or feedback
comment (detailed text reviews), the consistent recommendation for managing reputation
in online auctions is maximize the positive and minimize the negative for feedback type
and comments (Melnik & Alm, 2002; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; Resnick & Zeckhauser,
2002; Resnick, et al., 2006). It has been shown that negative information has a greater
impact than positive information on buyers. This bias of focusing on negative comments
and giving much greater weight to negative information in decision making has been well
documented (Ofir & Simonson, 2001; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004; Weinberg & Davis,
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2005). The finding of a negative bias only further emphasizes the importance of feedback
in online auctions as feedback types and comments tend to be permanent or very long
term. A typical example is eBay’s feedback policy which clearly states that feedback
ratings and comments are generally a permanent part of a member’s Feedback Profile
("About feedback," 2010).
One basic tenet of social psychology is people look to others for guidance in resolving
uncertainty in their judgments (Festinger, 1954). Theoretically under the right
circumstances individual judgment can be improved by listening to others. One of the
most ancient techniques in human society to gather additional information from others is
the use of word-of-mouth. Word-of-mouth is the most credible, objective, and influential
means for exchanging feedback information and building trust since this type of
communication among impartial buyers is unlikely to be biased or profit-driven (Kamins,
et al., 1977). Reputation systems incorporate feedback to build artificial word-of-mouth
networks in which individuals can share opinions and experiences (Resnick, et al., 2000).
The feedback mechanisms found in the reputation systems are changing people’s
behavior in subtle but important ways. Based on anecdotal evidence, people are now
increasingly relying on opinions posted on reputations systems in order to make decision
on selecting an honest seller, financial investments, and entertainment choices (Shirky,
2008). Even if buyers have slightly different understandings of what constitutes honest
seller behavior, it is possible to identify a broad set of feedback comments that a majority
of buyers would agree conveys honest seller behavior (Pavlou, 2002). Evidence from
prior research studies suggest people tend to rely on the opinions of others, even in the
presence of their own personal information (Banerjee, 1992). A traditional auction relies
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on direct reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were trustworthy with me before.” An
online auction relies on indirect reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were
trustworthy with others before.” In both cases past trustworthiness is a prerequisite for
future transactions. It is the information about reputation that enables trust by inducing a
reciprocal response (Dellarocas, 2006; Hendershott, 2006).
Trust
Trust is an essential element in forming and maintaining commercial relationships
(Nah & Davis, 2002). Trust is particularly challenging to develop in an online context
like an online auction (Cofta, 2006). The converse of trust in the online auction
environment is fraud. As a result trust and fraud have become important topics in online
auction research. Lansing and Hubbard (2002) and Albert (2002) examined possible
techniques to mitigate fraud through regulation. Bywell and Oppenheim (2001)
recommended bidders be more aggressive in pursing fraud complaints against sellers.
While fraudulent behaviors like competitive shilling, reserve price shilling, buy-back
shilling, and false bidding have been investigated by researchers like Kauffman and
Wood (2005) and Dong, Shatz, and Xu (2009).
For online auctions, trust translates to a good reputation in the form of positive
feedback ratings and feedback comments. A seller’s poor reputation can deter buyers
from participating in an auction (Brinkmann & Seifert, 2001). There is conflicting
research results on the effect of reputation on price paid. Melnik and Alm (2002) and Ba
and Pavlou (2002) showed a correlation of reputation score increasing with the price paid
by a seller. While the latest research from Kauffman and Wood (2006) could not find any
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significant effect of reputation on price. The conclusion is that there are other unknown
factors which are increasing or reducing the effect of reputation on price.
Fraud
The number of people being victimized by deceptive practices over the Internet
continues to rise (Grazioli & Wang, 2001). Auction fraud is a problem that has been
getting increasingly serious. The anonymity provided by online auctions may be fostering
deception as the deceiver is able to disassociate himself/herself from the deceiving
message (Bowker & Tuffin, 2003). On the Internet, high anonymity is possible making it
difficult to assess identity and accountability regarding deception. On average the number
of Internet frauds grew more than 250% annually (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003). The
Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) which was created by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the National White Collar Crime Center has received an increasing
number of complaint submissions each year.
The limited research that has been conducted has been unable to suggest systematic
approaches in detecting or preventing online auction fraud. Some researchers have
categorized online auction fraud into different types, but they have not constructed any
formalized methods to deal with them (C. Chua & Wareham, 2004). Work has been done
in other research areas related to online auction fraud detection - reputation systems
(Melnik & Alm, 2002; Resnick, et al., 2000; Resnick, et al., 2006), graph mining
(Zacharia, Moukas, & Maes, 1999), and trust (Gyongyi, Garcia-Molina, & Pedersen,
2004).
Research into feedback text comments is arguably more important than aggregate
feedback ratings or scores because it can provide greater insights into the behavior and
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character of sellers and buyers. However, it is only recently that research has been
undertaken specifically on feedback text comments and their impact on reputation
systems in online auctions (Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels 2004; Bolton, Loebbecke and
Ockenfels 2008; Dellarocas 2003; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002; Resnick et al. 2006).
Consumers read and place significant weight on detailed reputation system elements in
the feedback text comments found in a seller’s reputation feedback (Weinberg & Davis,
2005). This finding was supported by Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) who reported that
buyer feedback text comments in online auctions had a greater impact on a seller’s
credibility and benevolence than did aggregate “crude numerical” measures. They
advised online auction members to attract outstanding (i.e. extremely positive) feedback
text comments to avoid receiving abysmal (i.e. extremely negative) feedback text
comments. These research studies confirm the importance of feedback text comments
and provide supporting evidence on the continued use, role, and value of negativepositive feedback comments to buyers in online auctions.
Textual Analysis
Contextual analysis is a systematic method for analyzing data in a standardized way
(Weber, 1990). Contextual analysis can be applied to classify key ideas in any
communication media – written, audio, and visual. The term textual analysis is used
when contextual analysis is applied to written communication. What makes the textual
analysis technique powerful and effective is its use of coding and categorizing of the data
(Krippendorff, 1980). Coding is the marking of words or text passages with alphanumeric
codes. The codes are used to create categorical variables representing the original textual
information. The resulting categorical variables can be analyzed using standard statistical
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methods. One problem experienced by prior researchers working with feedback
comments was finding a technique to extract nuances, inferences, and information from
the provided textual data. The technique of choice by prior researchers to solve this
problem was textual analysis.
Summary
For online auctions a feedback system is the reputation mechanism used to facilitate
buyer’s trust and reduce the risk from the community of sellers which enables buyerseller transactions. Identifying online deception is important as deception in any form is
the enemy of trust and some degree of trust is required for all business transactions.
Opportunistic sellers use deception tactics to create an illusion of trustworthiness to the
buyers’ detriment. The problem is that identifying sellers that exhibit fraudulent behavior
is difficult as they constitute only a very small percentage of the entire online auction
population and are elusive adapting their behavior to avoid detection. The issue with
online auction fraud is further compounded as number of occurrences and resulting
monetary losses has increased every year. As a result trust and fraud have become
important topics in online auction research.
Research in online auction fraud is primary based on three methodologies – economic
modeling, legal analysis, and analyses of online auction lists (Wood, 2004). Analyzing
the feedback ratings and comments provided by buyers on a seller in online auction lists
is a common track taken by many prior researchers. Each succeeding group of
researchers has applied ever more varied and sophisticated techniques using the feedback
ratings and comments provided by buyers and sellers to analyze user interactions, user
behavior, and attempt to identify potentially criminal activity.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Preface
When conducting the research study, the initial plan was to use dedicated raters as
evaluators and coders for the duration of the work to be done. Based on best practices, a
pilot test was performed to estimate the time required and cost of performing the
research. The results of the pilot test indicated using the traditional method of dedicated
raters was not viable due to the excessive time of 175 days and estimated cost of $37,152.
An alternative method of crowdsourcing was found, determined to be viable, and used to
perform the required work for the research study.
The pilot test was based on the methodology details for the dedicated raters.
Significant portions of the alternative method of crowdsourcing were based on the
methodology details for the dedicated raters. As a result, the Methodology chapter
contains details for both methods which are referenced accordingly as “initial plan” for
using dedicated raters and “alternative plan” for crowdsourcing using Amazon
Mechanical Turk.
Introduction
Research in online auction fraud is primary based on three methodologies – economic
modeling, legal analysis, and analyses of online auction lists (Wood, 2004). The research
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study focused on analyzing the feedback comments provided by buyers on a seller in
online auction lists. The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of
negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is
behaving fraudulently. A diagram showing an overview of the research methodology can
be found in Appendix A.
Research Questions
The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback
comments by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. Three research
questions were used in framing an answer for this primary question.
There is a need to determine if the presence of negative-positive type feedback
comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently:
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
If the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers is a predictor
that a seller is behaving fraudulently per RQ1, then need to determine if the number of
negative-positive type feedback comments found for a given seller is a basis for the
strength of the predictive relationship. The form of the predictive relationship could be
linear or non-linear:
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does the number of negative-positive type feedback
comments from buyers predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
Any patterns found in the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments in a
seller’s transaction history could provide additional insights into seller and/or buyer
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behavior; or be used to augment the accuracy of negative-positive type feedback
comments as a predictor per RQ1:
Research Question 3 (RQ3): For each seller will negative-positive type feedback
comments from buyers fall into a pattern?
Defining Fraud
This raises the question – What is fraudulent? The definition of fraudulent per the
Merriam-Webster dictionary is "characterized by, based on, or done by fraud"
("Merriam-Webster's collegiate dictionary," 2005). The online auction company eBay
defines “fraud” as the seller’s failure to deliver the sold merchandise or the delivery of
the item in physically bad condition ("eBay buyer protection plan," 2010). For this
research study, fraud was defined in broader terms than eBay does. The terms
"fraudulent" and "problematic” transaction were used interchangeably as any breach of
the eBay User Agreement (contract) that comes at a cost to the buyer ("Your user
agreement," 2010). If the seller ships an item later than agreed upon without reimbursing
the buyer for the delay, late shipping constituted fraud. If merchandise differs from the
item’s auction description in make, model or condition (i.e. used vs. new), the seller
committed fraud. If the seller does not explicitly state that the item is not genuine (i.e. a
copy), the seller committed fraud. If any deficit attributes of the product are not explicitly
stated (i.e. headphones with a six-inch cord rather than the standard three to six foot
cord), the seller committed fraud. A fraudulent transaction does not exclusively mean
that a seller collected the buyer’s money and then failed to ship the item. Fraud was
viewed as the seller imposing a cost on the buyer for which other potential buyers should
be aware of when considering purchasing from that seller.
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The logic behind broadening the definition of fraud as committed by an opportunistic
seller becomes obvious once the content of feedback comments and anecdotal evidence
of postings on eBay’s discussion boards are reviewed. Although a seller’s action may not
be a breach under the legal terms of the eBay User Agreement, buyers have shown that
they are sensitive to any questionable action (or lack of action) by a seller. Broadening
the definition of fraud was also supported as most complaints filed with the FTC as
Internet auction fraud report problems are with sellers who fail to send the merchandise;
send something of lesser value than advertised; fail to deliver in a timely manner; or fail
to disclose all relevant information about a product or terms of the sale ("Online auction
fraud complaints still rising, says consumer watchdog," 2004). Similar to Nikitov and
Stone (2006), the preliminary evaluation of feedback comments and postings on eBay’s
discussion boards indicated that buyer complaints could be categorized as – product,
shipping, communication, and other (non-specific).
Research Design
The research study implemented a correlational research design using an automated
data collection agent (Creswell, 2002). The research study required the extraction and
analyzing of data that met predefined qualifying conditions from immense data sets.
Manually sifting through data sets of this magnitude was not practical due to the time and
labor required to extract the qualified data. Instead customized software in the form of an
automated data-collection agent was used to search, locate, and extract the qualified data
from the data set (Allen, Burk, & Davis, 2006). The objective of the research was to
determine if the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers
(independent variable) is a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently (dependent
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variable). The correlational research design provided for discovering relationships
between variables, measuring the degree and direction of relationships, and from the
discovered relationships predictions could be made.
Selection of Research Design
There are two basic types of research - experimental research and non-experimental
research. Each type of research answers different research questions and uses different
research designs to collect data (Creswell, 2002). Experimental research designs are
composed of true experimental and quasi-experimental. Non-experimental research
designs are composed of observational and correlational. The selection of the nonexperimental correlative research design was primarily due to constraints which
eliminated alternative research designs.
In the research study, a true experiment would violate ethical standards. The
researcher wanted to determine if a buyer will leave negative-positive type feedback
comments as an indicator that an opportunistic seller had behaved fraudulently. In the
hypothetical true experiment, one would start with a sample population of sellers and
divide them randomly into a treatment group (asked to make only fraudulent sales) and a
control group (asked to make only honest sales). After a period of time making sales to
the unaware buyers, the researcher would conduct a review of the buyer feedback
comments for both seller groups. Needless to say, such an experiment would violate
common ethical principles and criminal statutes.
A quasi-experimental design is one that looks like a true experimental design but lacks
the key ingredients of manipulation and random assignment. The most commonly used
quasi–experimental design is non-equivalent groups design. Due to the source of data
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(extracted from website pages) and type of data (historical transaction logs), it is
impossible to perform the required pre-test, treatment, and post-test for this research
design. Other researchers like Bajari and Hortacsu (2005), Brown, Forin and Rhodes
(2009), and Kauffman and Lee (2009) have used crawlers to collect data from website
pages, performed online auction focused research, and explicitly declared their research
design as quasi-experimental. However, upon closer examination the term quasiexperimental could only be loosely applied as all the required components – pre-test,
treatment, and post-test were not present.
Non-experimental designs are used to describe, differentiate, or examine associations,
as opposed to direct relationships, between or among variables, groups, or situations.
There is no random assignment, control groups, or manipulation of variables, as these
designs use observation only. The most common non-experimental designs are
observational and correlational studies.
The observational design is based on gathering detailed information about behavior.
Typically this is done by direct or indirect visual observation by the researcher of the
study subjects. As the data source was website pages and type of data was historical
transaction logs, there was no observable behavior rendering this research design moot.
A correlational research design focuses on investigating the existence and the degree
of a relationship between two or more quantitative variables. If two variables are highly
related, values of one variable could be used to predict values on other variable. The
objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive type
feedback comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. The
definition and functionality of the correlational research design made it the optimum
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choice for the research study. Selecting and combining the correlational research design
with a data collection agent provided another advantage as analyzing only a subset of all
available data increases the validity of the resulting conclusions, provided that the subset
of data is based on tightly defined and narrow conditions. The extracted subsets can
provide evidence for stronger conclusions regarding causality than uninformed analysis
of the entire data set (Creswell, 2002).
Limitations of Correlational Research Design
The correlational research design does provide the ability to detect patterns or
relationships among variables (i.e. Is X related to Y?). Relationships between variables
are discovered through the use of correlational statistics. These relationships could be
linear or non-linear in form. The correlation coefficient can provide a measure of the
degree and direction of relationship. From the discovered relationships predictions can be
made.
Correlational research design will not identify the causes or reasons for the observed
behavior. This is because a correlational relationship between variables could be the
result of an outside source. Based on this possibility, it must be understood that the
correlation does not necessarily explain cause and effect. Hence the maxim –
Correlational does not equal causation (Aldrich, 1995).
Under certain conditions, it may be possible to have a high degree of confidence that
there is causality between two variables. Determining the direction of causality can be
difficult or impossible to quantify. Casual direction can be hinted if information about
time is available. This is because a cause must precede its effects under classic
Newtonian physics and natural laws. The type of data to be used is time-stamped
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historical transaction logs which provide the possibility of indicating the direction of
causality.
Data Collection
Prior published research investigating online auction fraud generally started by
identifying two groups of sellers based on their historical behavior pattern - fraudulent or
honest. In the research study, the sample population was obtained by using an automated
data collection agent crawling over the eBay website.
The optimum means to secure data for research would be having it directly supplied
by the company which is the source for the study – eBay. Unfortunately, eBay will not
provide data upon request to researchers. Prior researchers have also experienced this
problem and resorted to either manually collecting the data or using an automated data
collection agent (i.e. web crawler or spider).
An Application Programming Interface (API) is an interface implemented by a
software program to enable interaction with other software or a website. It is not
uncommon for commercial companies to provide APIs to allow other companies to
interact with their website for product availability, pricings queries, place purchase
requests, etc. Providing APIs allows the target company to control access, optimize
usage, and throttle dataflow. APIs are a recently available option for eBay, but have
several issues that precluded their use ("Advanced research API," 2010). Although the
eBay API software is free, usage based on number of API calls is metered and charged
appropriately. The second issue is that the eBay APIs are limited in functionality as to
what data can be retrieved. As the data collection process would require hundreds of
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thousands of API calls and possibly need to be repeated multiple times, the cost would be
prohibitable.
The option most frequently chosen by prior researchers like Bapna, Goes, Gupta and
Jin (2004); Clemons, Hann and Hitt (2002); Easley and Tenorio (2004); Palmer (2002);
and Pavlou and Gefen (2004) was using a web crawler. A web crawler is a software
program that accesses a website and traverses through the site by following the links
present on the web pages. Although commercial web crawlers are available, their cost
and limited functionality forces most researchers to build a custom web crawler.
The custom automated web crawler used in this research study was written in Java
object-oriented programming language. The web crawler was specifically designed for
the eBay website to retrieve web pages, parse the webpage to find the required data,
determine if the found data met the selection criteria, and store the qualified data for later
analysis in a Comma Separated Variable (CSV) ASCII file. Details on the web crawler
design for this research study can be found in Appendix B.
There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to using an automated data collection
agent compared to performing the task manually. An advantage of using an automated
data collection agent is the reduction of human error in the data collection process.
Agents collect more qualified data in a significantly shorter period of time then possible
manually. One disadvantage is that large quantities of superfluous or irrelevant data can
be collected – this was avoided by defining very specific constraints for qualifying data.
Constructing a custom automated data collection can be a complex and time consuming
programming task depending on the data to be collected and the dispersion of data over
multiple linked web pages. There are potential legal issues of copyright in collecting data
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(Winn, 2005) or having an agent cause the equivalent of denial-of-service attack on a
website due to its processing demands (Mierzwa, 2005). eBay has pressed legal suits
against commercial companies for using automated data collection agents, but to date has
not restricted personal or research based use of automated data collection agents ("eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc," 2000).
How Much Data to Collect on Each Seller
Prior research shows that recent feedback is the most influential on online auction
buyers and also indicated buyers rarely examine feedback text comments beyond the first
webpage (Dellarocas, 2003b). Nikitkov and Stone (2006) found that opportunistic sellers
for practical reasons employ a long-term strategy of exploiting multiple buyers over an
extended period of time. Based on these two behavior patterns, it should be possible to
predict buyers will repeatedly be “caught” by opportunistic sellers as evidence of
previous fraudulent actions are “hidden” from any prospective buyer’s view as they roll
off the first webpage. From this it could be surmised that one characteristic for
identifying a typical opportunistic seller is multiple occurrences of negative-positive
feedback in his/her transaction history. Extrapolating on above suppositions, the multiple
occurrences of negative-positive type feedback comments should result in a “bunching”
or “clustering” pattern. The actual existence of a pattern and its construct was
investigated per the previously stated RQ3: For each seller will negative-positive type
feedback comments from buyers fall into a pattern? The forensic method of the research
study required the examination of a seller’s entire transaction history in order to identify
any pattern. Therefore, the entire transaction history was collected for each qualified
seller.
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Data Selection
The correlational research design provides for discovering relationships between
variables, measuring the degree and direction of relationships, and from the discovered
relationships predictions can be made. In the case of the research study – it was used to
explore if there is a relationship between the presence of negative-positive type feedback
comments by eBay buyers (independent variable) and eBay sellers identified as behaving
fraudulently (dependent variable). The collected data was separated into two groups
based on the characteristic of the seller’s behavior - honest and fraudulent.
The data sets behind the eBay website contain immense quantities of data currently
reported to exceed two petabytes ("eBay’s two enormous data warehouses," 2010). The
most recent numbers for eBay are from 2009 and show active registered users currently
total 90,000,000 ("Form 10-K for eBay for 2009," 2010). Combine this with the fact that
fraudulent sellers constitute a minuscule number of the active registered users, raises
some obvious questions. What size sample population is needed? How can the
probability be increased that the sample population includes multiple fraudulent sellers?
In order to build a sample population that contains sellers that behave honestly and
fraudulently, choosing the sellers randomly would not work as the probability of finding
even a single seller that behaves fraudulently (i.e. opportunistic seller) would be very
small. Exactly how small can been seen by the 0.01 percent officially reported by eBay
(B. Cox, 2003; Konrad, 2005). The number only rises to 0.20 percent based on a research
study of eBay fraud by Gregg and Scott (2008). Nor does it appear that fraudulent sellers
are evenly distributed across the thousands of sales categories available on the eBay
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auction site. The distribution of fraudulent sellers appears to be skewed and focused on
specific categories.
Prior researchers have determined which specific eBay sales categories have the
highest incidents of fraudulent sales (See Figure 7). Of particular interest is the
Computers and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks category where one research
study found three-quarters of the survey respondents did not receive their computer or it
arrived damaged (Gavish & Tucci, 2008).
Category
Baseball Cards
Camcorders
Coins
Computers and
Networking:
PC Laptops and
Notebooks
Jewelry
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Figure 7. Prior Research on eBay Sales Categories

Which raises the question - Why is the skewed distribution of fraudulent sellers of any
interest? A brief analogy will help answer this. Imagine hunting for a single needle in a
very large haystack. Odds are you either will not find the needle or have to invest
considerable time and effort to find it. How can you improve your odds of finding a
needle? The optimum answer requires adopting two strategies. First – search a smaller
haystack that purportedly has a needle in it (i.e. reduced solution space). Second increase your odds by finding a smaller haystack purportedly with multiple needles in it
(i.e. increase probability). Substituting needle with fraudulent seller and haystack with
sample population, the solution becomes obvious. Target the data selection process on
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extracting a sample population from a given eBay sales category that has been
demonstrated to contain a high number of potentially fraudulent sellers. For the research
study, the targeted eBay sales category used was Computers and Networking: PC
Laptops and Notebooks.
Dr. Floyd, a fictional character in the book 2010: Odyssey Two by Author C. Clark
(1983), said "Once is an accident; twice is a coincidence; three times is a conspiracy."
Based on a similar sentiment, one final step needed to be done to refine the data selection
process. A seller with a sales history showing a single sale in the Computers and
Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks category was more likely cleaning out a closet
rather than engaging in fraud. Repeated sales transactions by a seller in the category
demonstrate the difference between a casual seller and being in the business of selling
laptops either legitimately or fraudulently. A seller needs to have a track record in the
form of a sufficiently sized feedback history to provide for an accurate categorization of
the seller’s behavior as honest or fraudulent. Using the same initial data selection criteria
as that of Finch (2006), the initial plan was for sellers with a feedback score lower than
600 be excluded. A feedback score of 600 means that a seller had a minimum of 600
sales in all categories, but given the feedback response rate of 48.9% to 59.2% will have
a higher actual number of sales (Gregg & Scott, 2006; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002;
Wood, et al., 2002).
Should the resulting retrieved population size proved too small compared to the
required data sample size, the initial plan was to rerun the automated data collection
agent after adjusting the feedback score threshold filter. This process would be repeated
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as often as necessary until an appropriately sized data sample population size was
obtained. See Appendix A for a diagram of the research methodology.
Determining Data Sample Size
The initial plan’s sampling method was representational. Yamane (1967) provides a
simplified formula to calculate sample sizes (See Figure 8). Where n is the sample size, N
is the population size, and e is the level of precision:

Figure 8. Sample Size Formula

An example of how this sample size formula would be used is shown in Figure 9. For
demonstration purposes, let it be said that 2000 unique sellers were found listed in the
Computers and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks classification. A 95%
confidence level and p = 0.5 are assumed.

Figure 9. Example Calculation Using Sample Size Formula

Data Validity
There are two major threats to validity – internal threats and external threats. Internal
validity threats are experimental procedures, treatments or subject experiences that
threaten a researcher’s ability to correctly draw inferences from study population.
External validity threats are the result of the researcher incorrectly drawing inferences
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from the data to other settings (conditions) or apply it to past or future events. Each of
these threats to validity were addressed in the methodology for the research study.
Correlational studies are higher than true or quasi-experiments on external validity but
lower on internal validity (Creswell, 2002).
External Validity
External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study can be generalized
to a larger population. While true experiments have higher internal validity as they are
internally consistent what is sacrificed is the ability to generalize to the real world. The
non-experimental correlational research design achieves external validity through the
generalization to the studied population which in this case was the large (in the millions)
eBay auction site membership. As the auctions collected were selected on product
category, the auction sellers and buyers could not be selected a priori.
Internal Validity
Internal validity of a study establishes that the data or findings are true or measures
what is purported to be measured (Borg & Gall, 2006). Measurement error must be
minimized and the instruments for data collection must be trusted to ensure internal
validity.
Measurement error is the discrepancy between the observed value of a measurement
and the true value due to the error contained in the measuring instrument. Any
measurement error would be analyzed using statistical calculations. As a web crawler
was the instrument for data collection, the data collection procedure could be repeated
and results compared to prove replication and reliability.
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Internal validity can also refer to the extent which variation in the dependent measure
can be attributed exclusively to the independent variable. This is especially true in the
case of the experimental research designs where the independent variable is directly
manipulated in the treatment group, but not changed in the control group. In the research
study, the initial plan’s focus was on locating sellers with a large number of sales in order
to have the maximum number of buyer feedback comments to evaluate. Sampling would
be random based on “n” sellers with a feedback score greater than or equal to the filter
threshold number where “n” will be the suggested sample size for the given population.
The initial plan’s sampling technique would duplicate that previously used by Finch
(2006). Assignment to group – based on seller’s behavior (honest or fraudulent) – would
take place in a post-selection process when the seller was categorized by the evaluators.
Thus the selection of sellers would be blind as to group.
Reliability
Inter-rater agreement, inter-rater reliability, or concordance is the degree of agreement
among raters. Inter-rater agreement is used to measure reliability. Inter-rater agreement is
estimated based on the correlation of scores in the ratings of two or more observers
(raters) assigned to reviewing each behavior or observation. Two independent groups of
raters were used – evaluators and coders. Details for each type of rater are specified in the
appropriate sections describing the purpose, function, training, etc. In the initial plan
Cohen’s Kappa was to be used to assess inter-coder agreement among the raters. The
Kappa provides an estimate of reliability or an index of agreement between two raters’
observations or scores. Cohen’s Kappa ranges between 0 and 1 and represents the
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proportion of agreement corrected for chance (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & Barrett,
2007).
The alternative method which used crowdsourcing prevented the measuring of interrater reliability with Cohen’s Kappa. This was because raters were randomly and
anonymously assigned to each work unit known as a Human Intelligence Test (HIT).
Instead the techniques of multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), minimum
work time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing were used to ensure the
reliability of raters. These techniques are detailed in a later section entitled Building the
Prototype HITs for Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Sources of the Variables
The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive
type feedback comments by buyers is a indicator (predictor) that a seller is behaving
fraudulently (observed behavior). The correlational research design provides for
discovering relationships between variables, measuring the degree and direction of
relationships, and from the discovered relationships predictions can be made.
In terms of the correlational research design mechanics, the focus of the research
study was determining if there is a relationship [hereafter called the primary relationship]
between “negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers” and “a seller behaving
fraudulently.” If the primary relationship existed, then the next step was measuring the
degree and direction of the primary relationship (if possible). The remaining step was to
determine if predictions could be made based on the primary relationship.
In the research study, both of the variables in the primary relationship are abstracted
from the collected public eBay data. Presence or absence of a negative-positive type
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feedback was derived by coders reviewing the Buyer Feedback Type field (which must be
positive) and Buyer Feedback Comment field’s text format. The output from each of the
three coders was placed into separate fields - Negative-Positive 1, Negative-Positive 2,
and Negative-Positive 3. The Negative-Positive fields are categorical containing one of
the following values – Y (Yes) or N (No). Based on majority rule, a final inter-coder
agreed value was assigned to the Negative-Positive Consensus field.
The seller’s behavior – honest or fraudulent – was derived by the evaluators’
judgments of the seller’s behavior based on all the available eBay public data and using a
predefined criterion for what is fraudulent behavior. Each of the evaluators was asked to
answer the following key question for each seller – Is the seller exhibiting fraudulent type
behavior? The answer was either “No” the seller is not acting fraudulently (i.e. honest
behavior) or “Yes” the seller is acting fraudulently (i.e. fraudulent behavior).
After a seller has been reviewed by all evaluators, the answer from each of the three
evaluators was placed into separate fields - Fraudulent-Type Behavior 1, FraudulentType Behavior 2, and Fraudulent-Type Behavior 3. The Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields
are categorical containing one of the following values – N (No) or Y (Yes). Based on
majority rule (2 out of 3) of the Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields’ ratings, a final interevaluator agreed value of N or Y was assigned to the Fraudulent-Type Behavior
Consensus field.
Independent Variable
The independent variable (predictor) is typically the variable being manipulated or
changed and the dependent variable is the observed result of the independent variable
being manipulated. For this research study, the independent variable was indicated by the
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presence or absence of negative-positive type feedback in the Buyer Feedback Comment
field. The Negative-Positive Consensus field was the independent variable.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the event studied and expected to change whenever the
independent variable is altered. The observed phenomenon was the type of seller
behavior – honest or fraudulent - experienced by the buyer. The Fraudulent-Type
Behavior Consensus field was the dependent variable.
Data Record Layout
In order for the data collection agent to perform its function of parsing and extracting
data from the eBay web pages, exactly what data needed to be collected had to be clearly
defined. One of the steps in the methodology required evaluators to make a judgment of
classifying each seller’s behavior as honest or fraudulent. Naturally, the evaluators
wanted to review all the available data about a seller before forming an opinion. Even if
not used as part of the data analysis, one advantage of collecting the additional data was
that it might prove valuable in future research studies. Alternatively, unexpected events
or relationships could be uncovered when using the additional data.
See Appendix C for details on the data record layout. Detailed for each data field are
name, description, type, size, format, and comments. The eBay webpage source for each
data field can be found detailed in the crawler design (see Appendix B). For ease of
performing statistical analysis, only a single flat data file was created and seller data
fields were duplicated in every record (i.e. a sales transaction with buyer feedback).
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Data Obfuscation
Although the data collected was in the public domain, maintaining anonymity was still
a requirement. The first potential issue was preventing the coders from being effected by
any personal knowledge that they might have of an eBay seller’s or buyer’s identity via
their eBay userid. For example – Do not want a coder saying, “Hey that’s my sister’s
eBay userid!” The second potential issue was to prevent any bias by the coders based on
any other extraneous data. For example - an eBay userid that is political (HEILHITLER)
or derogatory (SLUTTYGIRL). Every eBay auction has a unique Item Number to
identify the item being offered for sale. Each collected record detailed a single purchase
by a buyer from a qualified seller with a corresponding Item Number uniquely identifying
the auction. In order to prevent the possibility of a coder looking up information about an
item using the Item Number, it was masked with a system generated autonumber field
named Feedback Number. As coders only had access to the content of two fields
[Feedback Number, Buyer Feedback Comment], this isolated the coders and ensured that
no extraneous data effected how they performed their task.
The situation was reversed with evaluators as no data obfuscation needed to be taken.
Evaluators needed to make a judgment in classifying each seller’s behavior as honest or
fraudulent. The evaluators wanted to review all the available data about a seller before
forming an opinion. An evaluator was required to indicate any personal knowledge of a
seller or buyer in the Other Comments section of the Evaluator Worksheet (see Appendix
D). As no evaluator indicated any personal knowledge of a seller or buyer, it was not
necessary for the researcher to review and determine what corrective action needed to be
taken in the case of personal knowledge by an evaluator.
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Identifying Fraudulent Sellers
There are only two sources with authority that can equitably state an eBay member is
a fraudster – eBay and criminal court rulings. Due to confidentiality, eBay will not
provide any details to third-parties on complaints against a member or indicate why a
member’s account was suspended or disabled. Therefore, an explicit confirmation that a
specific online auction member was an opportunistic seller from the primary source –
eBay - was not available. Observing the public actions of eBay –like suspending a
member’s account – did provide a secondary source from which some inferences could
be drawn.
The probability that a person who commits a fraudulent act will be caught and
prosecuted is very low. The execution of a fraudulent act often leaves the victim unaware
it has taken place or too embarrassed to report it. The covert nature of fraud makes
collecting sufficient evidence for prosecution and conviction time consuming and
difficult. Nonviolent crime like online auction fraud has a lower priority with law
enforcement agencies than violent crime against people or damage to property.
Even when a fraudster is caught and prosecuted, the person often receives a light
sentence or no sentence in return for restitution to the victims (C. Chua & Wareham,
2004). The result is the criminal court record containing formal prosecutions for online
auction fraud are very limited in number. In addition, the court records could be sealed
preventing public access to the details or not current enough to extract data from eBay as
it can take years for a final legal verdict to be reached.
Studying online deception is problematic as with other deviant behavior the successful
perpetrators work hard to avoid detection (Kauffman & Wood, 2000; Nikitkov & Stone,
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2006). An opportunistic seller will employ deception tactics in order to mask his/her
behavior and illicit activities. What can be done is quantifying the perception by others
that a specific online auction member exhibits the behaviors and actions characteristic of
a fraudulent seller. Based on the quantified perceptions, an inference can be drawn that a
specific online auction member is behaving fraudulently. The technique of using
inferences from secondary sources to indicate an individual’s probability of being an
opportunistic seller was done in prior research by Chua and Wareham (2008), Chua,
Wareham and Robey (2007), and Pandit, Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007).
All secondary sources can only make inferences or statements without being definitive
that an eBay member is behaving fraudulently. The relative measure of weight for an
inference or statement varies based on the secondary source. For example - A single
complaint message posted about a seller by one buyer on the eBay discussion board
would have a lower weight than an investigative news reporter’s article on an eBay
member’s potentially fraudulent acts. A single buyer’s posting must be considered an
opinion. Whereas an investigative reporter would be held to a higher standard with the
expectation of being objective, confirming any facts presented, and responsibility as the
reporter (or the publisher) could be taken to court for liable. However, the relative
measure of weights can be variable for any given secondary source. Imagine the
situation where multiple buyers instead of a single buyer posted complaint messages
about a seller on the eBay discussion board. With a number of buyers making a complaint
against a single seller, it raises the probability that the seller is engaged in fraudulent
behavior (Surowiecki, 2004). The relative measure of weight for each secondary source
was not a primary factor in this research. The constraint that must be remembered is
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secondary sources are not definitive and any findings must be held with that limitation in
mind. An example of mistakenly treating secondary sources as authoritative and
definitive can be found in the study of Pandit et al. (2007). In their study a statement was
made - “Through manual investigation (Website browsing, newspaper reports, etc) we
located 10 users who were guaranteed fraudsters” (Pandit, et al., 2007, p. 207). Using
secondary sources, a judgment based on the available evidence can be made with a
degree of confidence that a specific online auction member as a seller is behaving in an
honest or fraudulent manner. No secondary source can be used to definably state or label
an eBay member as a guaranteed fraudster.
Coding – Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent
Studying online deception is problematic when using conventional methods as with
other deviant behaviors the successful perpetrators work hard to avoid detection. By
developing explicit rules to distinguish between honest and fraudulent seller behavior, it
was possible to appropriately and constantly categorize a seller’s behavior as honest or
fraudulent.
In the initial plan, a minimum of three evaluators (who were unaware of the study’s
purpose) would be recruited and would each review all the sellers. An evaluator would be
required to make a judgment classifying each seller’s behavior as honest or fraudulent.
Which raises the question – On what criteria will the evaluators base their judgment?
As human behavior is complex and sometimes inconsistent, attempting to find a single
specific behavior pattern to signal fraudulent behavior is not realistic. Taking a clue from
prior research into credit card fraud, online auction fraud detection is based on looking
for red flags and behavior patterns (Bhargava, Zhong, & Lu, 2003). The mechanical
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process of going through a long checklist of all the potential red flags and behavior
patterns for even a single seller would be time consuming and any lapse by an evaluator
could result in a misclassification. As the number of sellers that would need to be
reviewed appeared to be in the hundreds, it would not be feasible to perform the task
entirely manually. Nor is there an automated means for making the required judgment.
Fortunately, there was a publicly available software application that automatically
searched for red flags and suspect behavior patterns in eBay auctions. The Auction
Inquisitor software checks an eBay auction for over 200 common and not-so-common
signs of fraud plus checks the seller's history, and finishes by presenting a report of the
results with comments (Ford, 2010). Using Auction Inquisitor as a front end for the
evaluation process provided the following advantages – greatly reduced the time required
to review the red flags and suspect behavior patterns for a seller; enabled the review
process to be performed consistently and without human error; and presented the results
in a summarized and standardized format. It must be made clear that the Auction
Inquisitor software did not make a judgment as to whether or not a seller’s behavior was
fraudulent. It only presented its findings in the form of a standardized summary report.
In the initial plan, each evaluator was to watch a training video on how to use the
Auction Inquisitor software application. A copy of the Evaluator Worksheet would be
provided to each evaluator (see Appendix D) and reviewed with the researcher. The
Evaluator Worksheet summarized the rules for what behaviors are deemed as fraudulent
for the research study (see prior section on Definition of Fraud). The procedure for
performing the seller evaluation is detailed in Appendix E. Ten preselected sellers would
be used for training to ensure that the evaluators experienced the full range of seller
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behaviors and understand the criterion for fraudulent behavior. The evaluators would be
physically separated in order to ensure that they worked independently. Each of the
evaluators would be asked to answer the following question for each seller – Is the seller
exhibiting fraudulent type behavior? The answer would be either “No” the seller is not
acting fraudulently (i.e. honest behavior) or “Yes” the seller is acting fraudulently (i.e.
fraudulent behavior). Upon successful completion of the training, the evaluators would
start work on the actual experimental data. Presentation of the sellers to each evaluator
would be random. After a seller was reviewed by all evaluators, the answer from each
evaluator would be placed into separate fields - Fraudulent-Type Behavior 1, FraudulentType Behavior 2, and Fraudulent-Type Behavior 3. The Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields
are categorical containing one of the following values – N (No) or Y (Yes). Based on
majority rule (2 out of 3) of the Fraudulent-Type Behavior fields’ ratings, a final interevaluator agreed value of N or Y would be assigned to the Fraudulent-Type Behavior
Consensus field.
In the initial plan, validity and reliability would be addressed by the following
methods. The author of the research proposal would evaluate a random sample set of
sellers independently and compare the results with those of the evaluators. This reliability
method has been deemed as the most accurate by Kolbe and Burnett (1991) and has been
used for textual analysis in prior research studies. Next Cohen’s Kappa would be used to
assess inter-evaluator reliability among the evaluators who were assessing fraudulent
behavior among sellers. In each case one person who was observing the situation
(assessing fraudulent behavior among sellers) was an indicator. The Kappa would
provide an estimate of reliability or an index of agreement between two raters’
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observations or scores. Cohen’s Kappa ranges between 0 and 1 and represents the
proportion of agreement corrected for chance (Morgan, et al., 2007). One Kappa would
compare the fraudulent-type behavior between evaluator 1 and evaluator 2; one Kappa
would compare evaluator 1 with evaluator 3; and one Kappa would compare evaluator 2
with evaluator 3. For inter-evaluator agreement, the majority ratings would be used (two
out of three) to code Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus as N (No) or Y (Yes).
Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive or Not
In a forensic case study of an opportunistic seller, it was found buyers sometimes
embed negative comments in positive feedback as a means of avoiding retaliation from
sellers and damage to their reputation. This category of positive feedback is described as
“negative-positive” feedback (Nikitkov & Stone, 2006). An example of negative-positive
feedback is “Good product, but slow shipping”. The objective of the research was to
determine if the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers is an
indicator that a seller is acting fraudulently. In order to meet this objective, the Buyer
Feedback Comment for every buyer needed to be reviewed and coded in order to identify
all the negative-positive feedbacks. As negative-positive feedback requires that the Buyer
Feedback Type be positive, any Buyer Feedback Comment that has Buyer Feedback Type
other than positive was filtered out as it did not need to be evaluated by the coders.
In the initial plan, a minimum of three coders (who were unaware of the study’s
purpose) would be recruited and would each review all the buyer feedback comments. A
coder would be required to make a judgment to classify a Buyer Feedback Comment as
being in negative-positive format or not by assigning a value to the Negative-Positive
field as Y (Yes) or N (No).
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The criteria required for the coder’s judgment would be minimal. eBay only provides
for three types of feedback - negative, neutral, and positive. A subset of positive feedback
would be flagged by the coders as negative-positive if it met one of the formats - “I was
pleased with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction” [+X, -Y] or “I was unhappy
about Y, but was pleased with X for the transaction” [-X, +Y]. A diagram of the coder
procedure can be found in Figure 10. As eBay Feedback Type is restricted to the value of
negative, neutral or positive; invalid feedback types were not present. Seller auction sales
without a feedback type do not appear in an eBay seller’s transaction history and
therefore were not collected or require review.

Figure 10. Flowchart of Coder Procedure
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In the initial plan, each coder would receive and review with the researcher a copy of
the Coding: Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive document (see
Appendix F). This document summarized the rules for classifying buyer feedback
comments as negative-positive or not. A preselected sample of 100 buyer feedback
comments would be used for training to ensure that coders experienced the full range of
seller feedback comments and understood the criterion for classification as negativepositive type feedback or not. The coders would be physically separated in order to
ensure that they worked independently. Each of the coders would be asked to answer the
following question for each buyer feedback comment – Does the buyer feedback
comment meet the criterion for negative-positive type feedback? The answer would be
either “No” does not qualify as negative-positive type feedback or “Yes” does qualify as
negative-positive type feedback. Upon successful completion of the training, the coders
would start work on the actual experimental data. Presentation of the buyer feedback
comments to each coder would be random. After a buyer feedback comment was
reviewed by all coders, the answer from each coder would be placed into separate fields Negative-Positive 1, Negative-Positive 2, and Negative-Positive 3. The Negative-Positive
fields are categorical containing one of the following values – N (No) or Y (Yes). Based
on majority rule (2 out of 3) of the Negative-Positive fields’ ratings, a final inter-coder
agreed value of N or Y would be assigned to the Negative-Positive Consensus field.
In the initial plan, validity and reliability would be addresses by the following
methods. The author of the research proposal would evaluate a random sample set of
buyer feedback comments independently and compare the results with those of the
coders. This reliability method has been deemed as the most accurate by Kolbe and
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Burnett (1991) and has been used for textual analysis in prior research studies. Next
Cohen’s Kappa would be used to assess inter-coder reliability among the coders who
were reviewing the buyer feedback comments for negative-positive type comments. In
each case one person who was observing the situation (coding the negative-positive
feedback comments among buyers) was an indicator. The Kappa would provide an
estimate of reliability or an index of agreement between two raters’ observations or
scores. Cohen’s Kappa ranges between 0 and 1 and represents the proportion of
agreement corrected for chance (Morgan, et al., 2007). One Kappa would compare the
negative-positive feedback between coder 1 and coder 2; one Kappa would compare
coder 1 with coder 3; and one Kappa would compare coder 2 with coder 3. For coder
agreement, the majority ratings would be used (two out of three) to code NegativePositive Consensus as Y (Yes) or N (No).
Population Size
In the initial plan, the population size needed to be estimated to determine the
feasibility of the traditional methodology of using dedicated raters. Using a prototype of
the proposed web crawler program, a full data extract from eBay was performed for the
previously identified target - Computers and Networking: Laptop category. A full data
extract included all sellers as it did not filter out sellers based on their feedback score.
The full data extract procedure was repeated once a week for three weeks with the results
summarized in figure 11. Where Total Auction Items was the number of individual items
listed in the category for sale. Where Total Unique Sellers was the number of unique
sellers (based on eBay userid) in the category. Elimination of duplicate sellers was a
necessary step as a single seller can list several items for sale. Where Total Feedback
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Comments was the composite of all feedback comments found in each unique seller’s
eBay member profile.
Week
1
2
3

Total Auction Items

Total Unique Sellers

15,823
15,282
16,431

438
406
446

Total Feedback
Comments
361,040
355,469
365,056

Figure 11. Data Extracts for Category – Computers & Networking: PC Laptops & Notebooks

The findings of the three full data extractions showed a relatively small population of
unique buyers ranging from 406 to 446. A small number of unique buyers could
adversely effect the research’s data analysis as the number of fraudulent sellers within the
eBay member population is reported to be very small. Exactly how small the fraudulent
seller population is could be seen by the 0.01 percent officially reported by eBay (B. Cox,
2003; Konrad, 2005). Based on this rate and a unique seller population of 446, the
number of fraudulent sellers would be estimated at 0.0446 which effectively was zero.
The number only rose to 0.20 percent based on a research study of eBay fraud by Gregg
and Scott (2008). Using this calculation and a unique seller population of 446, the
number of fraudulent sellers would be estimated at 0.892 which rounded up to one. Per
prior cited research studies, the distribution of fraudulent sellers appears to be skewed
and focused on specific categories like the Computers and Networking: PC Laptops &
Notebooks category. Even with the skewing effect should the number of eBay sellers
designated by the evaluators as exhibiting fraudulent type behavior had proven
insufficient, two options were available:
1. Select another skewed category with a larger unique seller population.
2. Combine multiple skewed categories to create a larger unique seller population.
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Whether or not either of these options would need to be implemented could only be
determined after the evaluators reviewed the unique sellers and determined the number of
sellers exhibiting fraudulent type behavior in the Computers and Networking: PC
Laptops and Notebooks category. Therefore the most prudent course of action was for
evaluators to complete their review of the unique sellers before the coders began work on
the buyer feedback comments. Two other conclusions were draw from the small number
of unique sellers that were found:
1. As the unique seller population needed to be maximized filtering the seller population
size based on feedback score was not required.
2. Sampling method and size for sellers was a moot point as finding a small number of
unique sellers required inclusion of the entire population.
Using the data extraction from week 3, an analysis was performed on the buyer
feedback comments population (see Figure 12).
Number
365,056
Total Feedback Comments
3,273
Minus Negative
3,030
Minus Neutral
2,167
Minus Blank
356,586
Remaining Positive
Minus As Buyer
13,224
7,566
Minus Non-English
Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments
335,796
Figure 12. Analysis of Data Extract for Week 3

Percent
100.00%
(0.90%)
(0.83%)
(0.59%)
97.68%
(3.62%)
(2.00%)
92.00%

The Total Feedback Comments found was 365,056. All unqualified records were deleted
from the Total Feedback Comments population:
Minus Negative – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Negative was removed
as negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive.
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Minus Neutral – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Neutral was removed as
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive.
Minus Blank – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of blank was removed as
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. eBay will set a feedback
type to blank for partially deleted or censured comments.
The Remaining Positive number of 356,586 contained only feedback comments that had
a feedback type of Positive.
Most eBay members switch between the roles of seller and buyer. Each qualified
seller’s eBay member profile can contain feedback for both roles. Therefore all feedback
comments in which the seller was acting as a buyer needed to be eliminated as designated
by Minus As Buyer.
A data set member which is different in some way from the general pattern is called
an outlier. An unexpected set of outliers were found during the analysis of the data
extract. Although eBay has websites hosted in over 30 countries, the ebay.com website
located in the United States is the largest and is used by eBay members living in other
countries. As a result, some of the buyer feedback comments from the international eBay
members were not in English. Non-English buyer feedback comments were found written
in French, German, Italian, Spanish, and other languages. Inclusion of non-English buyer
feedback comments would result in ambiguity due to translation plus the additional
expense of hiring translators. The assumption was made that buyer feedback comments
are consistent regardless of the language in which they are composed. That is to say a
buyer’s compliment or complaint about a seller in the form of a feedback comment was
independent of the spoken/written language used by the buyer. Therefore non-English
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buyer feedback comments which constitute less than 2% of the total population were
treated as outliers and excluded from the data to be analyzed. This exclusion was
indicated by Minus Non-English.
The analysis of the pilot data extract for week 3 provided quantitative measurements
for the magnitude of the proposed analysis work. As designated by Total Unique Sellers the total number of sellers that would need to be reviewed is 446. As designated by
Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments - the total number of buyer feedback comments that
would need to be reviewed is 335,796. When the actual production data extraction was
eventually performed for the dissertation report the resulting numbers did vary, but the
magnitude remained the same. This consistent order of magnitude made it possible to
estimate in advance the time and labor required (workload) to complete the analysis of
sellers and buyer feedback comments.
Analysis of the Seller Workload Using Traditional Dedicated Raters
The research study required analysis of two components – buyer feedback comments
and sellers. As previously stated the interpretation of the natural language contained in
the buyer feedback comments must be done by a human as automated options do not
provide the required accuracy. The analysis of the sellers was complex requiring a
judgment to determine whether each seller is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior or not.
As previously stated this judgment must be done by a human as an automated option does
not exist.
Having established that both components would require human analysis, a framework
for performing each analysis was specified. The seller analysis framework was described
in the prior section entitled Coding – Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or
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Fraudulent. The mechanics to implement the framework are described in step-by-step
detail for the evaluators per Appendix E – Coding: Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest
or Fraudulent. The buyer feedback comment analysis framework was described in the
prior section entitled Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as NegativePositive or Not. The mechanics to implement the framework are described in step-by-step
detail for the coders per Appendix F – Coding: Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as
Negative-Positive.
Using the data extraction from week 3 and following the section entitled Coding –
Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent, a time-trial test was run using three
individuals each assigned the role of evaluator. The researcher preselected a sample of
10 sellers to ensure that the evaluators experience the full range of seller behaviors. As
the objective of the test was to determine the average time required to review a seller,
inter-evaluator reliability was not measured. The average time to evaluate a single seller
was 20 minutes. This was calculated based on elapsed time for each evaluator to
complete the test divided by 10 sellers give the average time for the evaluator to review a
single seller. The average time for each of the three evaluators was summed together and
divided by three giving the overall average of 20 minutes. From this information, an
estimated time to complete the analysis and the cost of the analysis was extrapolated
using three dedicated raters as evaluators and a minimum wage rate of $8 per hour
(Figure 13).

446 Sellers X 0.33 Hours/Seller = 148 Hours [18.5 workdays]
148 Hours X $8.00/Hour X 3 Evaluators = $3,552
Figure 13. Analysis of Sellers – Estimated Time and Cost
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Analysis of the Feedback Workload Using Traditional Dedicated Raters
Using the data extraction from week 3 and following the section entitled Coding –
Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive or Not, a time-trial test was
run using three individuals each assigned the role of coder. The researcher preselected a
sample of 100 buyer feedback comments to ensure that the coders experienced the full
range of buyer feedback comments. As the objective of the test was to determine the
average time required to review a single buyer feedback comment, inter-coder reliability
was not measured. The average time to evaluate a single buyer feedback comment was 15
seconds. This was calculated based on elapsed time for each coder to complete the test
divided by 100 buyer feedback comments give the average time for the coder to review a
single buyer feedback comment. The average time for each of the three coders was
summed together and divided by three giving the overall average of 15 seconds. From
this information, an estimated time to complete the analysis and the cost of the analysis
was extrapolated using three dedicated raters as coders and a minimum wage rate of $8
per hour (Figure 14).

335,796 Buyer Feedback Comments X 15 Seconds/Buyer Feedback Comments
X 1 Hour/3600 Seconds = 1400 Hours [175 workdays]
1400 Hours X $8.00/Hour X 3 Evaluators = $33,600
Figure 14. Analysis of Buyer Feedback Comments – Estimated Time and Cost

Analysis Summary of the Workload Using Traditional Dedicated Raters
Three factors needed to be considered for the successful implementation and
completion of the research study – feasibility, time, and resources. A major cause of
failure was found in the lack of financial resources as the total estimated cost was
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$37,152 (Seller $3,552 + Feedback $33,600). The next issue was time with a minimum
requirement of 175 workdays for the coders to complete their work which was not
satisfactory. Lastly, measuring inter-rater reliability requires that all three raters for each
analysis complete all the work. Hiring a new rater would mean scrubbing any work
completed by the old rater and redoing all the work. The probability of one of the raters
quitting the project before completing all the work was high. Although manageable –
hiring a new evaluator would result in an additional 18.5 workday delay. Having to hire a
new coder would result in an additional 175 workday delay which would not be viable.
Thus the feasibility of using dedicated full-time raters was low.
One alternative to reduce the cost for analysis would be to minimize the number of
buyer feedback comments that are reviewed. Random sampling would normally be the
method used to achieve this goal. In research question 3 (RQ3), it was stated - For each
seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a pattern? As
the size of the buyer feedback comment population in negative-positive format was an
unknown at the time, inclusion of all negative-positive feedback comments was a
prerequisite to analyzing the presence or absence of any pattern. The conclusion drawn
was that the population would need to be analyzed in toto. In summary, the initial plan
using the traditional method of dedicated raters was not viable and an alternative
methodology for performing the two analyses was needed.
Introduction to Amazon Mechanical
One of the components of the Amazon Web Services suite is Amazon Mechanical
Turk ("Amazon Web Services," 2010). Launched in 2005 as a commercial offering,
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) was initially used by Amazon for internal projects
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("Amazon Mechanical Turk," 2010). Its purpose was to fulfill the demand for using
human intelligence rather than a computer to perform a task. This type of task was called
a Human Intelligence Task (HIT). A HIT is defined as a problem that humans find
simple, but computers are unable to do or find extremely difficult to do. For example a
HIT related to a photograph could be - “What animal is in this photograph?”
AMT is a commercial implementation of crowdsourcing. The concept of
crowdsourcing was first described in a Wired magazine article as outsourcing tasks to a
large group of people (Howe, 2006). Unlike user-generated content or social networks,
participants in a crowdsourcing have no contact with one another. One AMT worker
cannot see the results of another’s work. A problem is broken down into discrete tasks.
Each task is self-contained. As the tasks are self-contained, it is possible for each task to
be assigned to a different individual (or multiple individuals) and worked on
simultaneously. The resulting architecture is a massively parallel human work force. The
potential processing capacity of crowdsourcing architecture can be more fully appreciated
based on an observation by von Ahn et al. (2004) where they calculated that a crowd of
5,000 people playing an appropriately designed computer game 24 hours a day could
label all 425,000,000 images on the Google website in just 31days.
Within AMT users can function in two roles - requester and worker. Requesters post
work to be done using units called Human Intelligence Tasks or HITs (See Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Sample Human Intelligence Task (HIT)

Each HIT has a value in the form of a micro-payment which can be as little as $0.01.
Every HIT can be completed by one or multiple workers before it is removed from the
list of available HITs. The requester sets the number of workers based on assignments set
per HIT. An assignment is the maximum number of workers who can perform the task. A
HIT can optionally have one or more qualifications. A qualification can be a system
qualification provided by AMT like Worker HIT Acceptance Rate. Another type of
qualification is the user-defined qualification. A user-defined qualification is a test built
by a requester. For example requiring a worker to take a Spanish Comprehension Test
and pass with a minimum grade before being allowed to work on HITs translating
sentences from English to Spanish. A requester can specify a time limit within which
workers must complete work on a HIT. The requester pays the workers for completed
HITs, but has the ability to review and reject without payment any HIT deemed invalid.
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The requester can block workers based on their AMT userid from working on specific
HITs.
A person who signs up to perform work on AMT is described as a worker. AMT
workers commonly refer to themselves as “Turkers” in online discussion forums and
blogs (Snow, O'Connor, Jurafsky, & Ng, 2008). Workers are only paid upon completion
of work on a HIT and approval of the requester. Tasks are randomly assigned to a worker
within a HIT. Should a HIT have multiple assignments, a worker can only work on a
given task within a HIT once. Before choosing to work on a HIT - a worker can see
sample HITs, payment information, the time limit for working on a HIT, and any
qualification requirements. Workers discover HITs based on a keyword search interface
that provides HIT previews. It is the worker’s discretion to determine which HITs and the
number of HITs that will be worked on. Payments for completed tasks can be redeemed
by workers on Amazon via gift certificate or be later transferred to a worker's bank
account.
A hypothetical example to illustrate the mechanics for AMT - Imagine you own a
store that sells toys. Your store has a website on which customers can review your
inventory of toys and make purchases. The website displays your entire store inventory
of 2,000 toys. A picture and description for each toy to be displayed on the website are
stored in a database. You recently received complaints from multiple customers that
some of the toys’ pictures and descriptions do not match on the website.
The problem is “Does the toy’s picture correctly match its description?” In order to
solve this problem you would manually need to compare every toy’s picture against its
description. This is a time consuming task and prone to error due to its repetitive nature.
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Alternatively you can use AMT. Acting as an AMT requester you need to create 2,000
HITs – one HIT for each toy found in the database. It is not necessary to manually create
each of the 2,000 HITs. Using a HIT template (see Figure 16) and importing the contents
of the database, the 2,000 HITs can be automatically created.

Figure 16. Sample HIT Template

First you create the HIT template. Next using the newly created HIT template and
importing the contents of the website database, the 2,000 HITs are automatically created.
As requester you need to “Publish” the HITs to make them available to workers. An
example of the how a published HIT would look to a worker can be seen in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Sample HIT for a Worker

Almost immediately after being published the HITs will be discovered by workers in the
Amazon Mechanical Turk’s List of Available HITs. Multiple workers will
simultaneously work on completing the HITs by clicking on the appropriate answer of
YES or NO. As graphic image matching HITs are popular with workers, this number of
HITs would typically be completed in less than an hour at a cost of $20 (2,000 HITS X
$0.01/HIT).
AMT provides tools for a requester to monitor the HITs completion progress and
review a worker’s answer for each HIT. The requester pays the workers for completed
HITs, but has the ability to review and reject without payment any HIT deemed invalid.
The requester can block workers based on their AMT userid from working on specific
HITs. The results are exported in the format of CSV data file. The results can then be
analyzed to identify where a toy’s picture and description did not match (See Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Simplified and Annotated Example of HIT Results

Building the Prototype HITs for Amazon Mechanical Turk
In order to estimate the time and labor required (workload) for using AMT, a
prototype Seller HIT and prototype Buyer Feedback HIT was constructed.
Within the AMT both requesters and workers are anonymous with everyone provided
a unique system generated userid and identifiable information redacted. The two obvious
concerns in using AMT arise when asking unseen, remote, and random strangers to
perform a task. The first question was - How do you know that the workers will have the
prerequisite skills or knowledge to perform correctly the task? The second question was How do you know that the workers will actually make an effort to perform the task rather
than just randomly click on responses?
The question of a worker having prerequisite skills or knowledge was addressed
through the use of qualifications ("Amazon mechanical turk requester best practices
guide," 2010). A HIT can optionally have one or more qualifications. A qualification can
be a system qualification provided by AMT like Worker HIT Acceptance Rate. Another
type of qualification is the user-defined qualification. A user-defined qualification is a
test built by a requester. For example requiring a worker to take a Spanish
Comprehension Test and pass with a minimum grade before being allowed to work on
HITs translating sentences from English to Spanish.
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Two qualifications came directly from the sections entitled Coding – Identifying Seller
Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent and Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment
as Negative-Positive or Not. The two qualifications were common for both prototype
HITs – the worker must be 18 years or older AND the worker must be a native English
speaker. AMT has a mandated age requirement of 18 year or older for any worker. The
age qualification must be satisfied before AMT will issue an AMT userid to the worker.
A user-defined qualification named Research Qualification Native English Speaker was
created to qualify a worker as native English speaker (See Figure 19).

Figure 19. Research Qualification Native English Speaker

The definition of “native speaker” was taken in the content of "mother tongue" which is
the first language a person heard/spoke as a child ("Merriam-Webster's collegiate
dictionary," 2005). For the Research Qualification Native English Speaker qualification –
the required answers to qualify/pass as a “Native English Speaker” were YES for “I am a
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native English speaker” and YES for the “First language I spoke as a child was English.”
The other two questions were conspicuous distracters.
A third common qualification was based on a recommendation from the Amazon
Mechanical Turk Best Practices Guide ("Amazon mechanical turk requester best
practices guide," 2010). Per the guide, “To get the best selection of workers, we suggest
using workers that have an approval rating of 95% or higher” which was designated by
the system qualification named Worker HIT Acceptance Rate. This qualification was
automatically managed by AMT and only needed to be included in the list of
qualifications required for each of the prototype HITs.
For the prototype Seller HIT a user-defined qualification named Research
Qualification Seller Test was created to test the worker’s skills at performing the task of
evaluating sellers for exhibiting fraudulent type behavior. The user-defined qualification
was composed of a tutorial and a single seller which needed to be evaluated by the
worker. Due to the extended time required by a worker to review a seller only a single
seller was used in the qualification test. The qualification test was composed of 26
questions which were asked to assist and guide the worker in gathering the necessary data
to base their final judgment. The 27th question was the final judgment question – “Did
the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” and asked for a NO or YES
answer. As the qualification test seller clearly was exhibiting fraudulent type behavior,
the answer required to qualify/pass the Research Qualification Seller Test was answering
YES to the objective judgment question of “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type
behavior to buyers?” The Research Qualification Seller Test was set to manual which
required the researcher to individually review and authorize each worker as qualified.
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The manual option allowed the researcher to verify that the applicant worker actually
completed the 27 questions for the qualification test and was not gaming by just
randomly answering YES on the 27th question. The Research Qualification Seller Test
can be found in Appendix G - Research Qualification Seller Test.
Passing of the qualifiers – Research Qualification Native English Speaker and
Research Qualification Seller Test – permitted a worker to gain access to the prototype
Seller HIT named Research Prototype Seller. For a test population - the researcher reused
the same preselected sample of 10 sellers from the previously run evaluator time-trial
test. Each of the Research Prototype Seller HITs was based on the same format as the
Research Qualification Seller Test. It was composed of a single seller which needed to be
evaluated by the worker. Twenty-six questions were asked to assist and guide the worker
in gathering the necessary data to base their final judgment. The 27th question was the
final judgment question – “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” and
asked for a NO or YES answer. The last entry in the HIT form was an optional comment
field to provide a means for feedback from workers. The Research Prototype Seller HIT
was can be found in Appendix H - Research Prototype Seller HIT.
For the prototype Buyer Feedback Comment HIT a user-defined qualification named
Research Qualification Feedback Test was created to test the worker’s skills at
performing the task of evaluating buyer feedback comments. The researcher preselected
an additional sample of 50 buyer feedback comments to ensure that the AMT workers
would experienced the full range of buyer feedback comments. The user-defined
qualification was composed of a tutorial and 50 questions. Each question contained one
buyer feedback comment which needed to be evaluated by the worker. For each question
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a single buyer feedback comment was displayed, the question was asked “Is the
following statement in negative-positive format?” and asked for a NO or YES answer.
The worker’s responses were compared to the correct answers for each question. A grade
of 90% or higher was required to qualify/pass the Research Qualification Feedback Test.
The Research Qualification Feedback Test can be found in Appendix I - Research
Qualification Feedback Test.
Passing of the qualifiers – Research Qualification Native English Speaker and
Research Qualification Feedback Test – permitted a worker to gain access to the
prototype Buyer Feedback HIT named Research Prototype Feedback. For a test
population - the researcher reused the same preselected sample of 100 buyer feedback
comments from the previously run coder time-trial test. Each of the Research Prototype
Feedback HITs was similar in format to the Research Qualification Feedback Test but
only contained instructions/tutorial and a single question. In order to reduce scrolling
time, the instructions/tutorial were hidden by default, but could be toggled (display/hide)
by clicking on the hyperlink. One buyer feedback comment was displayed, the question
was asked “Is the following statement in negative-positive format?”, and the worker was
asked for a NO or YES answer. The last entry in the HIT was an optional comment field
which provided a means for feedback from workers. The Research Prototype Feedback
HIT with the instructions hidden can be seen in Appendix J - Research Prototype
Feedback HIT with Instructions Hidden. An example with the instructions displayed can
be seen in Appendix K - Research Prototype Feedback HIT with Instructions Displayed.
The second issue was whether or not the AMT workers would do the HITs correctly.
Even after qualifying/passing the pre-HIT qualifications, a worker could still give random

74
answers for a HIT. A perceived lack of accountability could motivate some AMT
workers to complete as many tasks as possible by just arbitrarily clicking. A classic
example of rational self interest where an individual attempts to maximize their
[monetary] rewards while minimizing their effort and costs. This type of activity by AMT
workers is known by the slang term of “gaming” (Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, & Cranor,
2010). In one of more recent developments, gaming has been taken to the next level by
the use of autonomous software applications known as “bots” to simulate human activity
(Dekel & Shamir, 2009).
AMT requires the requester to approve each HIT done by a worker. The requester
pays the workers for completed HITs, but has the ability to review and reject without
payment any HIT deemed invalid. The requester can block workers based on their AMT
userid from working on specific HITs. As the requester is the ultimate authority on the
disposition of any HIT, the question raised by the second issue was - What techniques
can a requester employ to ensure or measure the quality of a HIT?
Multiple techniques were applied to ensure or measure the quality of the data provided
by AMT workers. These selected techniques have been employed by prior researchers
when they used AMT - multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), minimum work
time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing.
Plurality (Multiple work assignments per HIT) is one of the three mechanisms built
into AMT to help ensure quality. Snow et al. (2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an
aggregate of four to six workers matched the results of a single domain expert. The use
of plurality has been tested and verified by Heilman and Smith (2010), Pinchak et al.
(2009), and Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2008). When a simple majority of the workers
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agree on the result, the result will be accepted as the “correct” answer. If no plurality
emerges, this usually means that the HIT is ambiguous (Barr & Cabrera, 2006).
AMT automatically measures and records the elapsed time required for a work to
complete a HIT. A requester has the ability to generate an ad hoc report while a HIT
batch is being processed to list all HITs completed below a specified minimum work
time. Extremely short HIT durations by a worker - especially if found for multiple HITs is an indicator of suspect work (Kittur, Chi, & Suh, 2008).
Both the qualification HITs and the tutorial/instructions included in each data HIT
clearly indicated that all workers would be audited. Signaling to potential workers that
their answers would be critically analyzed for invalid or random responses has been
proven to increase the quality and time spent on the HITs (Kittur, et al., 2008).
Gold standard data is a collection of preselected data that have a known set of
answers. These answers are typically produced by one or more individuals who are
trusted and a domain expert. Gold standard data was used to ensure the accuracy of the
answers provided by the AMT workers. If answers provided by a worker significantly
deviates from the gold standard, then there is a high degree of probability that the worker
is poorly performing, not doing what was asked or is attempting to game the system. This
technique has been used by Tang and Sanderson (2010), Sorokin and Forsyth (2008), and
Callison-Burch and Dredze (2010). The mechanics for the technique was randomly
inserting (also known as salting) gold standard data into HITs. A worker did not know if
the data to be evaluated came from the new data or from the gold standard. Details on
construct of the gold standard data sets can be found in the sections - Creating Gold
Standard Sellers and Creating Gold Standard Feedbacks.
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Analysis of the Seller Workload Using Amazon Mechanical Turk
A pilot run was done using the AMT Research Prototype Seller HIT. Parameters were
set to match those of the previously completed time-trial run using traditional dedicated
raters (evaluators). The HIT assignment was set to three to allow three workers to serve
in the role of evaluator for each Research Prototype Seller HIT. For a test population the researcher reused the same preselected sample of 10 sellers from the previously run
evaluator time-trial test. AMT automatically calculated the average time for a worker to
evaluate a single seller at 22 minutes.
Using AMT requires that all HITs be self-contained. The self-containment makes it
possible for each HIT to be assigned to a different worker (or multiple workers) and
processed simultaneously. The resulting architecture is a massively parallel human work
force. The variability of the massive parallel architecture makes it difficult to calculate
quantitatively the total time required to review all the feedbacks. Based on empirical
evidence from prior research studies, the estimated total time required to process all the
sellers would range from a few hours to a few days (Heilman & Smith, 2010; Su, Pavlov,
Chow, & Baker, 2007). As AMT workers are paid piece-work per HIT, there was no cost
for the time spent by workers.
The pilot run for the Research Prototype Seller HIT mimicked the time-trial test in
having three evaluators (workers) reviewing each seller. The idea being that simple
majority rule would be used to formulate the “final” answer for any question. Snow et al.
(2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six workers matched the
results of a single domain expert. A majority of five workers was cited by Yan et al.
(2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95% accuracy. Heilman
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and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2008) also
determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT. Based on this evidence
the number of workers assigned to a production Seller HIT was increased from three to
five for the production runs.
Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts,
2009). The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a
low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches
in the event of low worker response.
The quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Especially as the only data to
be collected was the final judgment answer of YES or NO contained in the 27th question
of “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” The answers for the other
26 questions were not collected or analyzed as their sole purpose was to assist and guide
the worker in gathering the necessary data to base their final judgment. The population of
production Seller HITs was salted with 10% Gold Standard Sellers. The 10% gold
standard measure was within the suggested 5% to10% range ("Crowdflower - gold
standard," 2010).

78
From the prototype test information, an estimated cost of the analysis was extrapolated
using the proposed five evaluators (Figure 20).
446 Sellers X 1.10 Gold Standard Multiplier1 X 1 HIT/Seller
X $0.25/HIT X 5 Evaluators = $614
Note: 1 of every 10 Seller HITs will be a Gold Standard Seller.
Figure 20. Analysis of Sellers – Estimated Cost using AMT

Analysis of the Feedback Workload Using Amazon Mechanical Turk
A pilot run was done using the AMT Research Prototype Feedback HIT. Parameters
were set to match those of the previously completed time-trial run using traditional
dedicated raters (coders). The HIT assignment was set to three to allow three workers to
serve in the role of coder for each Research Prototype Feedback HIT. For a test
population - the researcher reused the same preselected sample of 100 feedbacks from the
previously run coder time-trial test. AMT automatically calculated the average time for a
worker to evaluate a single buyer feedback comment at 17 seconds.
Using AMT requires that all HITs be self-contained. The self-containment makes it
possible for each HIT to be assigned to a different worker (or multiple workers) and
processed simultaneously. The resulting architecture is a massively parallel human work
force. The variability of the massive parallel architecture makes it difficult to calculate
quantitatively the total time required to review all the feedbacks. Based on empirical
evidence from prior research studies, the estimated total time required to process all the
buyer feedback comments would range from a few hours to a few days (Heilman &
Smith, 2010; Su, et al., 2007). As AMT workers are paid piece-work (per HIT), there
was no cost for the time spent by workers.
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The pilot run for the Research Prototype Feedback HIT mimicked the time-trial test in
having three coders (workers) reviewing each feedback. The idea being that simple
majority rule would be used to formulate the “final” answer for any question. Snow et al.
(2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six workers matched the
results of a single domain expert. A majority of five workers was cited by Yan et al.
(2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95% accuracy. Heilman
and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2008) also
determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT. Based on this evidence
the number of workers assigned to a production Seller HIT was increased from three to
five for the production runs.
Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts,
2009). The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a
low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches
in the event of low worker response.
The number of questions (buyer feedback comments to be reviewed) in the production
feedback HIT was raised from one as seen in the prototype Feedback HIT to ten. There
were two compelling reasons to do this. The first was the need to cut costs as paying even
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at the lowest possible rate of $0.01 when multiplied by hundreds of thousands of HITs
results in a total cost of thousands of dollars. As the time and effort required answering a
single question was minimal, pooling multiple questions together into a single HIT was a
viable and common practice used by requestors (Feng, Besana, & Zajac, 2009; Finin,
Murnane, Karandikar, Keller, & Martineau, 2010). Second, the quality of the workers’
data was a critical concern. Multiple questions per HIT made it possible to salt each HIT
with one or more Gold Standard Feedbacks (Finin, et al., 2010). Each production
Feedback HIT was salted with one Gold Standard Feedback which resulted in a gold
standard measure of 10%. The 10% gold standard measure was within the suggested 5%
to 10% range ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010).
From the prototype test information, an estimated cost of the analysis was extrapolated
using the proposed five coders (Figure 21).
335,796 Buyer Feedback Comments X 1.10 Gold Standard Multiplier1
X 0.10 HITs2/Buyer Feedback Comment X $0.01/HITs X 5 Coders = $1847
Note 1: 1 of the 10 feedback comments per HIT will be a gold standard question.
Note 2: 10 feedbacks/HIT is equal to 0.10 HIT/feedback.
Figure 21. Analysis of Buyer Feedback Comments – Estimated Cost Using AMT

Analysis Summary for the Workload Using Amazon Mechanical Turk
Three factors needed to be considered for the successful implementation and
completion of the research study – feasibility, time, and resources. The required financial
resources were viable as sufficient research funding was available to cover the total
estimated cost of $2,461 (Seller $614 + Feedback $1,847). The next the issue was time –
Based on empirical evidence from prior research studies, the estimated total time required
to process all the seller and buyer feedback comments would range from a few hours to a
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few days (Heilman & Smith, 2010; Su, et al., 2007). As AMT workers are paid piecework per HIT, there was no cost for the time spent by workers. Since the maximum time
required to process all the data was estimated at a few days, should it have proven
necessary the process could have been repeated multiple times in the event of an
unexpected glitch occurring or to process additional data that was collected. The only
constraint would be securing additional funding. The feasibility of using AMT was
proven based on the successful pilot runs of the prototype Seller HIT and the prototype
Feedback HIT. As with prior researchers that have used AMT, the major concern was
applying the appropriate techniques to ensure that quality data would be produced by the
workers. For integrity, a new group of people served as raters in creating the gold
standard data for the study. Selection and qualification of new raters followed the
procedure previously defined in the sections - Coding – Identifying Seller Behavior as
Honest or Fraudulent and Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as NegativePositive or Not. In summary, the proposed alternative of using AMT to process the
experimental data was a viable solution.
Creating Gold Standard Sellers
Gold standard data was used to ensure the accuracy of the answers provided by the
AMT workers. If answers provided by a worker significantly deviated from the gold
standard, then there was a high degree of probability that the worker was poorly
performing, not doing what was asked or was attempting to game the system.
A quality control technique used by Tang and Sanderson (2010), Sorokin and Forsyth
(2008), and Callison-Burch and Dredze (2010) was randomly inserting (also known as
salting) gold standard data into HITs to identify poorly performing, malicious or gaming
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workers. A worker did not know if the data to be evaluated came from the new data or
from the gold standard. Workers that gave too many wrong answers to the gold standard
were more likely to add noise to the overall results and needed to be filtered out. Noise is
defined as the measure of deviation from the gold standard data (Hsueh, Melville, &
Sindhwani, 2009).
Gold standard data is a collection of preselected data that have a known set of
answers. These answers are typically produced by one or more individuals who are
trusted and a domain expert. Snow et al. (2008) demonstrated using multiple non-experts
averaged out the noise resulting in the same quality answer as an expert. This technique
was then applied by Snow et al. (2008) to produce gold standard data used in training sets
as no gold standard data existed. Similarly research by Callison-Burch (2009) on machine
translation quality and by Nowak and Ruger (2010) on tagging of images supported the
findings that when combined non-expert judgments were equal to or better than human
experts. As no gold standard data set existed for determining whether or not an eBay
seller is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior, the technique of using multiple non-experts
was used to create a Gold Standard Sellers.
A gold standard with noise would only support cautious benchmarking as it requires
performance of the workers be better than the baseline by more than that which can be
attributed to the noise. As noise is defined as the measure of deviation from the gold
standard data (Hsueh, et al., 2009), noise level is reduced as the inter-rater agreement for
an answer is increased. Noise is totally eliminated when all the raters are in agreement for
an answer. In order to produce gold standard data with no noise, only answers with a
strict metric were included. Strict metric is defined as the raters having consensus for an
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answer (Ku, Lo, & Chen, 2007). The use of strict metric (consensus) negated the need to
measure inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa.
When the production data extract was completed, a seller was randomly selected from
the extracted population. The randomly selected seller was reviewed by five qualified
and dedicated evaluators. The number of evaluators selected was based on the
recommendations of Snow et al. (2008), Callison-Burch (2009), and Klebanov and
Beigman (2009). The same five evaluators were used to review all the sellers. The
evaluation process followed the procedure as specified in the section entitled Coding –
Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent. A seller was only added to the Gold
Standard Sellers if all the evaluators had a consensus in their answer. Any seller that did
not have evaluator consensus was discarded. The suggested quantity of gold standard
data is from 5% to 10% of the total population ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010).
Based on the unique seller population size of 502 (See Chapter 4 for details), the size of
the Gold Standard Seller data set could range from 25 to 50. Sellers continued to be
randomly selected by the researcher and evaluated by the evaluators until the Gold
Standard Seller data set was populated with the minimum number of 25 required
candidates. All sellers were unique within the Gold Standard Seller data set – no
duplicates.
Creating Gold Standard Feedbacks
Gold standard data was used to ensure the accuracy of the answers provided by the
AMT workers. If answers provided by a worker significantly deviated from the gold
standard, then there was a high degree of probability that the worker was poorly
performing, not doing what was asked or was attempting to game the system.
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A quality control technique used by Tang and Sanderson (2010), Sorokin and Forsyth
(2008), Callison-Burch and Dredze (2010), and other researchers was randomly inserting
(also known as salting) gold standard data into HITs to identify poorly performing,
malicious or gaming workers. A worker did not know if the data to be evaluated came
from the new data or from the gold standard. Workers that gave too many wrong answers
to the gold standard were more likely to add noise to the overall results and needed to be
filtered out. Noise is defined as the measure of deviation from the gold standard data
(Hsueh, et al., 2009).
Gold standard data is a collection of preselected data that have a known set of
answers. These answers are typically produced by one or more individuals who are
trusted and a domain expert. Snow et al. (2008) demonstrated using multiple non-experts
averaged out the noise resulting in the same quality answer as an expert. This technique
was then applied by Snow et al. (2008) to produce gold standard data used in training sets
as no gold standard data existed. Similarly research by Callison-Burch (2009) on machine
translation quality and by Nowak and Ruger (2010) on tagging of images supported the
findings that when combined non-expert judgments were equal to or better than human
experts. As no gold standard data set existed for determining whether or not an eBay
buyer feedback comment is in negative-positive format or not, the technique of using
multiple non-experts was used to create a Gold Standard Feedbacks.
A gold standard with noise would only support cautious benchmarking as it requires
performance of the workers be better than the baseline by more than that which can be
attributed to the noise. As noise is defined as the measure of deviation from the gold
standard data (Hsueh, et al., 2009), noise level is reduced as the inter-rater agreement for
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an answer is increased. Noise is totally eliminated when all the raters are in agreement for
an answer. In order to produce gold standard data with no noise, only answers with a
strict metric were included. Strict metric is defined as the raters having consensus for an
answer (Ku, et al., 2007). The use of strict metric (consensus) negated the need to
measure inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa.
After the production data was extracted, it was filtered leaving only qualified data
which was 382,768 buyer feedback comments (see Chapter 4 for details). An eBay buyer
feedback comment was randomly selected from the filtered population. The randomly
selected feedback comment was reviewed by five qualified and dedicated coders. The
number of coders selected was based on the recommendations of Snow et al. (2008),
Callison-Burch (2009), and Klebanov and Beigman (2009). The same five coders were
used to review all the feedback comments. The evaluation process followed the
procedure as specified in the section entitled Coding – Indentifying Buyer Feedback
Comment as Negative-Positive or Not. A feedback comment was only added to the Gold
Standard Feedbacks if all the coders had a consensus in their answer. The same five
coders were used to review all the feedback comments. Any feedback comment that did
not have coder consensus was discarded. The population of feedback comments to be
evaluated was 382,768 (see Chapter 4 for details). Because of the immense amount of
data to be processed, it was broken down into 50 batches (See section Implementation of
Production Feedback HIT for Amazon Mechanical Turk). The calculated size of a batch
was about 7,700 feedback comments. The suggested quantity of gold standard data is
from 5% to 10% of the population ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010). Multiplying
5% times the 7,700 batch size yielded a result of 385. The size of the Gold Standard
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Feedbacks data set could range from 385 to 770. Feedback comments continued to be
randomly selected by the researcher and evaluated by the coders until the Gold Standard
Feedbacks data set was populated with the minimum number of 385 required candidates.
All feedback comments were unique within the Gold Standard Feedbacks data set – no
duplicates.
Implementation of Production Seller HIT for Amazon Mechanical Turk
A production Seller HIT was created and named Research Production Seller. No
changes were made to the production Seller HIT, therefore it had exactly the same format
as the prototype Seller HIT (See Appendix H - Research Prototype Seller HIT). The
production Seller HIT was used by AMT workers to answer YES or NO to the judgment
question – “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” As in the pilot test,
the following qualifications were placed on the production Seller HIT - Worker HIT
Acceptance Rate, Research Qualification Native English Speaker, and Research
Qualification Seller Test. Workers were only given permission to gain access to the
production Seller HITs after qualifying/passing all the qualifications.
Snow et al. (2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six
workers matched the results of a single domain expert. A majority of five workers was
cited by Yan et al. (2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95%
accuracy. Heilman and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and GarciaMolina (2008) also determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT.
Based on this evidence the number of workers assigned to the production Seller HIT was
set to five.
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The quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Especially as the only data to
be collected was the final judgment answer of YES or NO contained in the 27th question
of “Did the seller exhibit fraudulent type behavior to buyers?” The answers for the other
26 questions was not collected or analyzed as their sole purpose was to assist and guide
the worker in gathering the necessary data to base their final judgment. The population of
production Seller HITs was salted with 5% Gold Standard Sellers which were generated
in a prior section entitled Creating Gold Standard Sellers. The 5% gold standard measure
was within the suggested 5% to10% range ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010).
Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts,
2009). The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a
low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches
in the event of low worker response.
The total seller population of 502 was broken up into 10 batches for processing on
AMT. This was done for three reasons. First, per the “best strategy for a requester”
multiple batches provided a mechanism to adjust micro-payments (if necessary) while
completing the data processing at the lowest possible cost. Second, small batches made it
easier to monitor and block any mass attempt at gaming by comparing worker answers to
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the Gold Standard Sellers. Third, it provided time to review the HIT’s comment field for
feedback from workers. Small batches made it possible to incorporate valid suggestions
or make corrections without having to reprocess all the seller data. No suggestions were
incorporated and no corrections were required for the production run. The comment field
at the bottom of the HIT allowing for worker feedback replicated the technique used by
Kosara and Ziemkiewicz (2010), Nowak and Ruger (2010), and Sorokin and Forsyth
(2008).
Implementation of Production Feedback HIT for Amazon Mechanical Turk
A production Feedback HIT was created and named Research Production Feedback
(See Appendix L – Research Production Feedback HIT). The number of questions (buyer
feedback comments to be reviewed) in the production Feedback HIT was raised to ten
compared to the one as seen in the prototype Feedback HIT. There were two compelling
reasons to do this. The first was the need to cut costs as paying even at the lowest
possible rate of $0.01 when multiplied by hundreds of thousands of HITs results in tens
thousands of dollars for a total cost. As the time and effort required answering a single
question was minimal, pooling multiple questions together into a single HIT was a viable
and common practice used by requestors (Feng, et al., 2009; Finin, et al., 2010; Wenzel,
2008). Second, the quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Multiple questions
per HIT made it possible to salt each HIT with one or more Gold Standard Feedbacks
(Finin, et al., 2010).
As in the pilot test, the following qualifications were placed on the production
Feedback HIT - Worker HIT Acceptance Rate, Research Qualification Native English
Speaker, and Research Qualification Feedback Test. Workers were only given
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permission to gain access to the production Feedback HITs after qualifying/passing all
the qualifications.
Snow et al. (2008) indicated for a large set of HITs, an aggregate of four to six
workers matched the results of a single domain expert. A majority of five workers was
cited by Yan et al. (2010) as the best strategy in consistently achieving more than 95%
accuracy. Heilman and Smith (2010), Pinchark et al. (2009), and Heymann and GarciaMolina (2008) also determined that five workers was the optimum number per HIT.
Based on this evidence the number of workers assigned to the production Feedback HIT
was set to five.
The quality of the workers’ data was a critical concern. Each production Feedback
HIT was salted with one Gold Standard Feedback which resulted in a gold standard
measure of 10%. The 10% gold standard measure was within the suggested 5% to10%
range ("Crowdflower - gold standard," 2010). The Gold Standard Feedbacks were
generated in a prior section entitled Creating Gold Standard Feedbacks.
Experiments by other researchers using AMT demonstrated that first response to five
one-cent HITs is 50-60% faster than a single five-cent task (Yan, et al., 2010). A review
of financial incentives showed that increasing the micro-payment of HITs resulted in an
increase in the quantity of work done, but not the quality of the work (Mason & Watts,
2009). The conclusion - If the micro-payment is too high, financial resources are wasted
and inefficient workers are attracted. Elasticity of HIT throughput appears to be more
dependent on the number of available online workers rather than the size of the HIT’s
micro-payment. The best strategy for a requester to adopt is start the first HIT batch at a
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low micro-payment and only increase the micro-payment size in subsequent HIT batches
in the event of low worker response.
The total feedback population of 382,768 was broken up into 50 batches for
processing on AMT. This was done for four reasons. First, the massive size of the total
feedback population was easier to handle when broken down into small batches. Second,
per the “best strategy for a requester” multiple batches provided a mechanism to adjust
micro-payments (if necessary) while completing the data processing at the lowest
possible cost. Third, small batches made it easier to monitor and block any attempt at
gaming by comparing worker answers to the Gold Standard Feedbacks. Fourth, it
provided time to review the Production Feedback HIT’s comment field for feedback
from workers. Small batches made it possible to incorporate valid suggestions or make
corrections without having to reprocess all the buyer feedback comment data. No
suggestions were incorporated and no corrections were required for the production run.
The comment field at the bottom of the HIT allowing for worker feedback replicated the
technique used by Kosara and Ziemkiewicz (2010), Nowak and Ruger (2010), and
Sorokin and Forsyth (2008).
Data Analysis
Data was entered into IBM SPSS Statistics 18 for Windows software application for
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the sample and included frequency
and percentages for nominal and categorical data. Means and standard deviations were
applied to interval or ratio data. Per Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) the following
standards were used - for categorical data a 5% margin of error is acceptable; for
continuous data a 3% margin of error is acceptable; for a dichotomous variable like
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Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus a 5% margin of error is acceptable; and a 95%
confidence level with p = 0.5 is acceptable for most basic research studies. For a
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications)
variable, a 5% margin of error is acceptable (Bartlett, et al., 2001). A 95% confidence
level and p = 0.5 were assumed for the research study as this is acceptable for most basic
research studies (Bartlett, et al., 2001).

For each research question, a null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are stated.
Details are provided indicating the variables that would be used and statistical
calculations that would be performed. Based on the principle of falsifiability (Gavin,
2008), statistical calculations were performed to test the null hypothesis for rejection. If
the null hypothesis was rejected, then the alternative hypothesis would be examined to
determine if that could be accepted. The result for each of the research questions is
detailed in Chapter 4.
Research Question 1 (RQ1)
Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict evaluators’
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
Null Hypothesis (H1o): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers
do predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not negative-positive type
feedback comments from buyers predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent
behavior. For this analysis, the independent (predictor) variable was Negative-Positive
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Consensus field and the dependent (criterion) variable was seller behavior. Seller
behavior was represented by the Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus field.
Logistic regression (also known as the logistic model or logit model) was the
appropriate statistic to analyze the data as the research question is to examine how an
independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive dichotomous (divided or dividing into
two sharply distinguished parts or classifications) criterion variable.
The Chi-square significance test was used to test the null hypothesis of no association
between the independent variable (Negative-Positive Consensus) and the dependent
variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus).
Research Question 2 (RQ2)
Does the number of negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict
evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
Null Hypothesis (H2o): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments
predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not the number of negativepositive type feedback comments predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent
behavior. Logistic regression was the appropriate way to analyze the data as research
question 2 was to examine how an independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications)
criterion variable. In this case, the independent variable was obtained by counting the
number of negative-positive comments to achieve a continuous value. The dependent or
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criterion variable was consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior which was
dichotomized (1 = Y, 0 = N).
Research Question 3 (RQ3)
For each seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a
cluster?
Null Hypothesis (H3o): For each seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not
fall into a cluster.
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): For each seller negative-positive feedback comments fall
into a cluster.
For the testing of whether or not negative-positive type feedback comments fell into a
cluster, a Chi-square test of Independence was used. A cluster was determined when
negative-positive type comments were found grouped around traditional comments in the
sellers’ feedback transaction history. For example, when negative-positive type
comments were separated by two traditional comments, and then followed by another
occurrence of a negative-positive comment, a cluster was identified. In a cluster, the
negative-positive type comments could be separated by as many as two traditional
comments. For this analysis, the feedback either fell into the cluster (Yes) or not (No).
Summary
The objective of the research study was to determine if the presence of negativepositive type feedback comments by buyers is a predictor that a seller is behaving
fraudulently. The correlational research design provided for discovering relationships
between variables, measuring the degree and direction of relationships, and from the
discovered relationships predictions could be made. The correlational research design
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(see Appendix A) was implemented using an automated data collection agent in order to
efficiently sift through the massive quantities of data on eBay and locate the qualified
sellers. The methodology was constructed with the goal of reducing the subjectivity and
increasing the reliability of categorizing seller behavior as honest or fraudulent and buyer
feedback comments as negative-positive or not.
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Chapter 4
Results

Introduction
This chapter provides a presentation of the research findings and analysis of the data
that was collected. It includes a review of the objective of the research study; the data
collection procedure; the three research questions (with null and alternative hypothesis
for each); data analysis for the research questions; and a summary of results.
Objective of the Study
In a forensic case study of an opportunistic seller by Nikitov and Stone (2006), it was
found buyers sometimes embedded negative comments in positive feedback as a means
of avoiding retaliation from sellers and damage to their reputation. This category of
positive feedback is described as “negative-positive” feedback. An example of negativepositive feedback is “Good product, but slow shipping.” The objective of this study was
investigating the concept of using negative-positive feedback as a signature to identify
potential opportunistic sellers in an online auction population.
Data Collection
The issue of obtaining a sufficient population of sellers that exhibited fraudulent type
behavior was previously discussed in the section entitled Population Size in Chapter 3
Methodology. Each of the three full data extractions from the pilot study found relatively
small populations of unique buyers - 406, 438, and 446 (see Figure 11). A small number
of unique buyers could adversely effect the research’s data analysis as the number of
fraudulent sellers within the eBay member population is reported to be very small. Per
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prior cited research studies, the distribution of fraudulent sellers appears to be skewed
and focused on specific categories. Based on this information, the category of Computers
and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks was selected for its potential in containing
multiple fraudulent sellers.
The web crawler (see Appendix B) used was custom designed for the eBay website to
retrieve the raw data. The web crawler retrieved web pages, parsed the webpages to find
the required data, determined if the found data met the selection criteria, and stored the
qualified data for later analysis in a Comma Separated Variables (CSV) ASCII file as
specified in Appendix C. The search space used by the web crawler was bounded by all
sellers in the category of Computers and Networking: PC Laptops and Notebooks. The
result of the production full data extraction was a data set composed of 467,071 buyer
feedback comments created by 502 unique eBay sellers.
The evaluators reviewed the unique eBay sellers and identified based on majority rule
(3 of 5) the sellers exhibiting fraudulent behavior in the Computers and Networking: PC
Laptops and Notebooks category. Out of a total of 502 unique eBay userids, the number
of sellers identified as exhibiting fraudulent behavior was 19. This translated to 3.78%
(19/502) of the total sellers were exhibiting fraudulent behavior. This number was
sufficiently large enough to eliminate the need to rerun the web crawler using a new
category or multiple categories in order to locate more eBay sellers exhibiting fraudulent
type behavior.
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Descriptive Statistics of the Collected Data
A summary of the collected data from the web crawler run can be seen in Figure 22.
Number
467,071
Total Feedback Comments
2,422
Minus Negative
2,757
Minus Neutral
1,048
Minus Blank
460,844
Remaining Positive
74,865
Minus As Buyer
3,211
Minus Non-English
382,768
Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments
Figure 22. Analysis of Extracted Production Data

Percent
100.00%
(0.52%)
(0.59%)
(0.22%)
98.67%
(16.03%)
(0.69%)
81.95%

The Total Feedback Comments found was 467,071. All unqualified records were deleted
from the Total Feedback Comments population by the researcher:
Minus Negative – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Negative was removed
as negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive.
Minus Neutral – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of Neutral was removed as
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive.
Minus Blank – Any feedback comment with a feedback type of blank was removed as
negative-positive feedback requires a feedback type of positive. eBay will set a feedback
type to blank for partially deleted or censured comments.
The Remaining Positive number of 460,844 contained only feedback comments that had
a feedback type of Positive.
Most eBay members switch between the roles of seller and buyer. Each qualified
seller’s eBay member profile can contain feedback for both roles. Therefore all feedback
comments in which the seller was acting as a buyer were eliminated by the researcher as
designated by Minus As Buyer.

98
Inclusion of non-English buyer feedback comments could result in ambiguity due to
translation plus the additional expense of hiring translators. The assumption was made
that buyer feedback comments are consistent regardless of the language in which they
are composed. That is to say a buyer’s compliment or complaint about a seller in the
form of a feedback comment is independent of the spoken/written language used by the
buyer. Therefore non-English buyer feedback comments which constitute less than 1% of
the total population were treated as outliers and excluded from the data to be analyzed.
This exclusion made by the researcher was indicated by Minus Non-English.
As designated by Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments - the total number of buyer
feedback comments that needed to be reviewed by the coders was 382,768.
Amazon Mechanical Turk Processing – Sellers
From the total population of the 502 unique eBay sellers, one seller at a time was
randomly pulled and evaluated by dedicated raters (evaluators) until 25 sellers were
found having consensus of all evaluators (5 of 5). The seller was then added to the Gold
Standard Sellers data set. As a matter of record, all the Gold Standard Sellers were
classified as honest. This left 477 eBay sellers which needed to be processed. For quality
control purposes, the 25 Gold Standard Sellers were added back into pool – resulting in
502 unique eBay sellers to be reviewed by Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) evaluators.
The sellers were randomly divided among the ten batches for processing on AMT.
A total of 19 sellers were designated by the AMT evaluators as fraudulently behaving
sellers based on majority rule (3 of 5). An additional 18 sellers were tagged by AMT
evaluators as potentially fraudulent sellers, but each of these sellers only received one or
two votes which were insufficient to make a majority and be classified as fraudulent
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sellers. Time for processing was approximately two days. The micro-payment was $0.30
per Human Intelligence Test (HIT) with five assignments.
Amazon Mechanical Turk Processing – Buyer Feedback Comments
As designated by Qualified Buyer Feedback Comments (see Figure 22) - the total
number of buyer feedback comments that needed to be reviewed by the coders was
382,768. As 50 batches would be used, the estimated size per batch was 7,700. The gold
standard was set to 5% of the batch size which was 385 feedback comments (7,700 X
0.05). Feedback comments were randomly pulled and evaluated by dedicated raters
(coders) until 385 feedback comments were found having consensus of all coders (5 of
5). The feedback comment was then added to the Gold Standard Feedbacks data set. This
left 382,383 buyer feedback comments remaining to be evaluated (382,768 – 385).
The remaining feedback comments were randomly divided among 50 batches for
processing on AMT. Each HIT was composed of ten feedback comments. Nine feedback
comments for the HIT came from the batch. For quality control purposes, the tenth
feedback comment in each HIT was randomly salted with one of the 385 Gold Standard
Feedbacks. Repetitive use of Gold Standard Feedbacks in the batches was not an issue as
many feedback comments like “Good seller!” were commonly used by multiple buyers.
Out of 382,768 feedback comments, 2,247 were identified by coders as negativepositive feedback comments based on majority rule (3 of 5). Thus negative-positive
feedback comments constituted only 0.59% of the total qualified positive buyer feedback
comments (2,247/382,768). Time for processing was approximately five days. The
micro-payment was $0.01 per HIT with five assignments.
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Amazon Mechanical Turk – Quality Control
The techniques of qualification tests, multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality),
minimum work time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing were used to
ensure the reliability of raters. The Research Qualification Seller Test was set to manual
which required the researcher to individually review and authorize each worker as
qualified. Seven AMT workers were rejected for the Research Qualification Seller Test.
No seller production HITs were rejected. For the feedback production HITS, the work (in
entirety) done by three AMT workers was rejected. One AMT worker was obvious
gaming as only N (No) was entered as an answer to every question. The other two AMT
workers failed to correctly answer multiple Gold Standard Feedbacks, it was concluded
that they were either gaming by randomly answering or had poor performance. When
HITs were rejected and released for processing by other workers, a reject message was
sent to the effected AMT worker explaining that the required level of quality was not
met. The rejected AMT worker was then blocked from working on any more HITs.
Analysis Delimitations
Data was entered into IBM SPSS Statistics 18 for Windows software application for
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the sample and included frequency
and percentages for nominal and categorical data. Means and standard deviations were
applied to interval or ratio data. Per Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins (2001) the following
standards were used - for categorical data a 5% margin of error is acceptable; for
continuous data a 3% margin of error is acceptable; for a dichotomous variable like
Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus a 5% margin of error is acceptable; and a 95%
confidence level with p = 0.5 is acceptable for most basic research studies. For a
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dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications)
variable, a 5% margin of error is acceptable (Bartlett, et al., 2001). A 95% confidence
level and p = 0.5 were assumed for the research study as this is acceptable for most basic
research studies (Bartlett, et al., 2001).

For each research question, a null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are stated.
Details are provided indicating the variables that were used and statistical calculations
that were performed. Based on the principle of falsifiability (Gavin, 2008), statistical
calculations were performed to test the null hypothesis for rejection.
Research Question 1 (RQ1)
Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict evaluators’
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
Null Hypothesis (H1o): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers
do predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not negative-positive type
feedback comments from buyers predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent
behavior. For this analysis, the independent (predictor) variable was Negative-Positive
Consensus field and the dependent (criterion) variable was seller behavior. Seller
behavior was represented by the Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus field.
Logistic regression was the appropriate statistic to analyze the data as the research
question was to examine how an independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications)
criterion variable. Results of the logistic regression are displayed in Figure 23.
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Independent Variable
Negative Positive Feedback
Model

B
0.60

SE
0.06

Wald
97.27

p
< 0.001

Exp(B)
1.82

Y = -2.40 + 0.06* Negative-Positive Feedback

Figure 23. Negative-Positive Feedback Comments
Predicting Evaluators’ Consensus of Seller Fraudulent Behavior

Any p less than 0.05 are significant. As seen in Figure 23, the p for the logistic
coefficient was < 0.001 which means the logistic coefficient was statistically significant.
The Chi-Square test calculation performed was represented by Chi2 with one degree of
freedom. The degree of freedom is equal to the number of standard normal deviates being
summed – one. The resulting Chi-Square calculation was Chi2 (1) = 84.40.
The p is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme in a Chi-Square
distribution. Any p less than 0.05 are significant. Using a Table of χ² Value vs. P-Value
with Chi2 (1) = 84.40, the resulting p was < 0.001 which was classified as statistically
significant (Fisher, 1995).
A Chi-Square significance test was used to test the null hypothesis of no association
between the independent variable (Negative-Positive Consensus) and the dependent
variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus). The Chi-Square test was significant
with Chi2 (1) = 84.40, p < 0.001. It clearly rejected the null hypothesis that no
independent variable (Negative-Positive Consensus) was correlated to the dependent
variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus). With the Chi-Square test as significant
and the logistical regression’s p as significant, it suggested that negative-positive type
feedback comments from buyers predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent
behavior.
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Two descriptive measures of goodness-of-fit are Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke
(1991). In linear regression, R2 has a clearly defined definition as the proportion of the
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictor(s) in the linear
model. Several attempts have been made to devise an equivalent of R2 for the logistic
model. None currently render the meaning of the variance (Menard, 2000). None
correspond to predictive efficiency. For these two reasons, the two R2 indices were not
included in the evaluation of the logistic model.
Wald statistics (Harrell, 2001) is for testing the significance of the explanatory
(independent) variables in the logistics model. As only a single independent variable
Negative-Positive Consensus was used, it rendered this statistic moot.
In Figure 23, B represents the regression coefficient for the predictor which is
Negative-Positive Consensus. A positive regression coefficient means that the
explanatory (independent) variable increases the probability of explanatory variable
decreases the probability of the outcome. A large regression coefficient means that the
explanatory variable strongly influences the probability of the outcome. A near-zero
regression coefficient means the explanatory variable has little influence on the
probability of the outcome. The value of B was 0.6 which showed an increase in
probability of the outcome, but with a less than one multiplier the explanatory variable
influence was moderated.
The exponent of B in the logistic regression yields the odds ratio. Odds ratios whose
confidence limits are greater or less than one are statistically significant. For SPSS the
odds ratio is labeled as Exp(B). The logit b = 0.6 in the B column in Figure 23 resulted in
a corresponding odds ratio [Exp(B)] of 1.82. The results of the logistic regression
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suggested that as buyers tended to have negative-positive feedback; sellers were 1.82
times more likely to be fraudulent.

Fraudulent
Type
Behavior

Negative-Positive Consensus
Yes
No
Total
15
4
19
Yes
101
382
483
No
502
Total Sellers

Figure 24. Comparing Coders Negative-Positive Feedback Consensus
to Seller Fraudulent Behavior by Evaluators

The actual counts of sellers based on coders negative-positive feedback consensus
compared to sellers exhibiting fraudulent type behavior as found by the evaluators is
summarized in Figure 24. The off-diagonal cells in the table containing the values of
four and 101 showed the lack of buyer negative-positive feedback comments when sellers
were not exhibiting fraudulent type behavior. Conversely, the other off-diagonal cell in
the table containing the values of 15 and 382 showed the presence of buyer negativepositive feedback comments and when sellers exhibited fraudulent type behavior.
The null hypothesis H1o was rejected for RQ1.
Research Question 2 (RQ2)
Does the number of negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict
evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
Null Hypothesis (H2o): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments
predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
A logistic regression was conducted to assess whether or not the number of negativepositive type feedback comments predicted evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent
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behavior. The independent (predictor) variable was the Number of Negative-Positive
Feedbacks Comments and the dependent (criterion) variable was seller behavior. Seller
behavior was represented by Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus (1 = Y, 0 = N). In this
case, the independent variable was obtained by counting the number of negative-positive
feedback comments for each seller to achieve a continuous value. The total seller
population was 502 sellers. A total of 19 sellers were previously identified by evaluators
as exhibiting fraudulent behavior. The remaining 483 sellers were previously identified as
honest by the evaluators. The total number of buyer feedback comments previously
categorized by coders as negative-positive type was 2,247.
Logistic regression was the appropriate statistic to analyze the data as the research
question was to examine how an independent variable predicts a mutually exclusive
dichotomous (divided or dividing into two sharply distinguished parts or classifications)
criterion variable. Results of the logistic regression are displayed in Figure 24.
Independent Variable
Number of Negative-Positive
Feedback Comments
Model

B
0.04

SE
0.01

Wald
13.02

p
< 0.001

Exp(B)
1.04

Y = -3.51 + 0.04* Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments

Figure 25. Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments
Predicting Evaluators’ Consensus of Seller Fraudulent Behavior

Any p less than 0.05 are significant. As seen in Figure 25, the p for the logistic
coefficient was < 0.001 which means the logistic coefficient was statistically significant.
The Chi-Square test calculation performed was represented by Chi2 with one degree of
freedom. The degree of freedom is equal to the number of standard normal deviates being
summed – one. The resulting Chi-Square calculation was Chi2 (1) = 10.92.
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The p is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme in a Chi-Square
distribution. Any p less than 0.05 are significant. Using a Table of χ² Value vs. P-Value
with Chi2 (1) = 10.92, the resulting p was < 0.001 which was classified as statistically
significant (Fisher, 1995).
A Chi-Square significance test was used to test the null hypothesis of no association
between the independent variable (Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments)
and the dependent variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus). The Chi-Square test
was significance with Chi2 (1) = 10.92, p < 0.001. It clearly rejected the null hypothesis
that no independent variable (Number of Negative-Positive Feedback Comments) was
linearly correlated to the log odds of the dependent variable (Fraudulent-Type Behavior
Consensus). With the Chi-Square test as significant and the logistical regression’s p as
significant, it suggested that the number of negative-positive feedback comments from
buyers predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent behavior.
Two descriptive measures of goodness-of-fit are Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke
(1991). In linear regression, R2 has a clearly defined definition as the proportion of the
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the predictor(s) in the linear
model. Several attempts have been made to devise an equivalent of R2 for the logistic
model. None currently render the meaning of the variance (Menard, 2000). None
correspond to predictive efficiency. For these two reasons, the two R2 indices were not
included in the evaluation of the logistic model.
Wald statistics (Harrell, 2001) is for testing the significance of the explanatory
(independent) variables in the logistics model. As only a single independent variable
Negative-Positive Consensus was used, it rendered this statistic moot.
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In Figure 24, B represents the regression coefficient for the predictor which is
Negative-Positive Consensus. A positive regression coefficient means that the
explanatory (independent) variable increases the probability of explanatory variable
decreases the probability of the outcome. A large regression coefficient means that the
explanatory variable strongly influences the probability of the outcome. A near-zero
regression coefficient means the explanatory variable has little influence on the
probability of the outcome. The value of B was 0.04 which showed an increase in
probability of the outcome, but with a less than one multiplier the explanatory variable
influence was highly moderated.
The exponent of B in the logistic regression yields the odds ratio. Odds ratios whose
confidence limits are greater or less than one are statistically significant. For SPSS the
odds ratio is labeled as Exp(B). The logit b = 0.04 in the B column in Figure 23 resulted
in a corresponding odds ratio [Exp(B)] of 1.04. The results of the logistic regression
suggested that for every one unit increase in the number of negative-positive feedback
comments, sellers were 1.04 times more likely to be fraudulent.
The null hypothesis H2o was rejected for RQ2.
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Research Question 3 (RQ3)
For each seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a
cluster?
Null Hypothesis (H3o): For each seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not
fall into a cluster.
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): For each seller negative-positive feedback comments fall
into a cluster.
A Chi-Square test was conducted to assess whether or not negative-positive type
feedback comments fall into a cluster. A cluster was determined when negative-positive
type comments were found grouped around traditional [not negative-positive] comments
in the sellers’ feedback comments history. For example, when negative-positive type
comments were separated by two traditional comments, and then followed by another
occurrence of a negative-positive comment, a cluster was identified. In a cluster, the
negative-positive type comments could be separated by as many as two traditional
comments. For this analysis, the feedback either fell into the cluster (Yes) or not (No).
Results of the Chi-Square test are displayed in Figure 26.
Chi2
426.18

df
1

p
<.001

No Cluster
694

Cluster
109

Expected
401.5

Figure 26. Chi-Square on Negative-Positive Feedback Comments Falling
into a Cluster

The p is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme in a Chi-Square
distribution. Any p less than 0.05 are significant. Using a Table of χ² Value vs. P-Value
with Chi2 (1) = 426.18, the resulting p was < 0.001 which was classified as statistically
significant (Fisher, 1995).
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The Chi-Square test calculation performed was represented by Chi2 with one degree of
freedom. The degree of freedom is equal to the number of standard normal deviates being
summed – one. The resulting Chi-Square calculation was Chi2 (1) = 426.18. The results
suggested that negative-positive type feedback comments did not fall into a cluster,
therefore the null hypothesis was accepted. No clustering of negative-positive type
feedback was revealed for 694 sellers and 109 sellers did reveal clustering of negativepositive type comments. The expected count for each cell was 401.5 [(694+109)/2)]
suggesting that fewer sellers than expected had negative-positive type comments that was
clustered.
The null hypothesis H3o was accepted for RQ3.
Summary of Results
The research was divided into four parts – collecting the data using a web crawler,
manually scrubbing the collected data, coding the data using crowdsourcing, and
performing data analysis on the three research questions using SPSS.
The web crawler searched the category of Computers and Networking: PC Laptops
and Notebooks extracting raw data consisting of 467,071 eBay buyer feedback
comments. After scrubbing the data to only include qualified buyer feedback comments
and eliminating outliers consisting of non-English comments, the remaining dataset to be
processed contained 382,768 buyer feedback comments. From the scrubbed dataset, a
total of 502 unique eBay sellers were identified.
Using traditional dedicated raters to process the collected data was not viable due to
extensive time required and high monetary cost. An alternative solution of
crowdsourcing was used with service provided by Amazon Mechanical Turk.
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Crowdsourcing proved viable as all the work was processed in less than seven days with
a considerable cost savings compared to traditional dedicated raters. Multiple techniques
were used to ensure data quality - qualification tests and data quality techniques of
multiple worker assignments per HIT (plurality), minimum work time per HIT, gold
standard data, and advice of auditing.
Evaluators identified 19 out of the 502 unique eBay sellers as exhibiting fraudulent
behavior. This translated into 3.78% of the sellers classified as behaving fraudulently.
The remaining 483 sellers were classified as honest.
Coders categorized 2,247 out of 382,768 buyer feedback comments as negativepositive type. This translated into 0.59% of the total buyer feedback comments were
negative-positive type.
The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback
comments by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. Three research
questions were used in framing an answer for this primary question.
For research question 1 - Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior? The null hypothesis of
Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not predict evaluators’
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based on the results of the
logistic regression and Chi-Square test. The results of the logistic regression suggested
that as buyers tended to have negative-positive feedback; sellers were 1.82 times more
likely to be fraudulent.
For research question 2 - Does the number of negative-positive type feedback
comments from buyers predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
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The null hypothesis of The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does not
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based on
the results of the logistic regression and Chi-Square test. The results of the logistic
regression suggested that for every one unit increase in the number of negative-positive
feedback comments, sellers were 1.04 times more likely to be fraudulent.
For research question 3 - For each seller will negative-positive type feedback
comments from buyers fall into a cluster? The null hypothesis of For each seller will
negative-positive feedback comments do not fall into a cluster was accepted based on the
results of the Chi-Square test.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
The research had a good outcome as an exploratory study. It identified a variable that
appears to be a new indicator for identifying potentially fraudulent sellers in eBay. The
research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback comments
by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently.
The findings of Zhang (2006) showed that eBay buyers provided 99% positive
comments, 0.7% negative comments, and 0.3% neutral comments. In January 2008, eBay
made a fundamental change to the feedback system where sellers could leave only
positive or neutral ratings for buyers. That meant buyers were free to leave negative
feedback without fear of feedback-retaliation. Logically, buyers should have responded
by providing negative feedback when appropriate. Gregg and Scott (2008) reported that
although the new policy has been in effect for a year, the status quo remained with eBay
still reporting less than 1% negative feedback; most members had a 99% or higher
feedback rating; and the percentage of fraudulent transactions continued to rise.
This research study was conducted almost two years after the change in the eBay
feedback system was implemented. It found almost exactly the same conditions
previously reported by Gregg and Scott (2008) - eBay still reporting less than 1%
negative feedback and most members had a 99% or higher feedback rating. The research
study found out of 467,071 buyer feedback comments – 98.67% were positive comments,
0.52% were negative comments, 0.59% were neutral comments, and 0.22% were blank
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comments (see Chapter 3 - Figure 22). Thus the premise for the research study – buyer
reluctance to report negative feedback – was confirmed.
Three research questions were used in framing an answer for the research objective –
Is the presence of negative-positive type feedback comments by buyers a predictor that a
seller is behaving fraudulently? Each research question is presented and its findings from
Chapter 4 analyzed.
Research Question 1 (RQ1)
Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict evaluators’
consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
The null hypothesis of Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based on
the results from the logistic regression. The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2
(1) = 84.40, p < 0.001. As the null hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis
H1a must be accepted.
The results of the logistic regression suggested that as buyers tended to have negativepositive feedback; sellers were 1.82 times more likely to be fraudulent. This was
evidence that the presence of even a single negative-positive feedback type comment had
a strong correlation with a seller exhibiting fraudulent behavior.
Prior studies by Goes, Tu, and Tung (2009), Gregg and Scott (2008), and Pandit,
Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007) used only negative feedback ratings and comments to
identify sellers as fraudulent. As a signature, negative feedback ratings composed only
0.7% per Zhang (2006) and 0.52% per the research study of the total feedback
population. Negative-positive feedback comments found in the research study composed
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0.48% (2,247/467,071) of the total feedback population. Like the other signatures negative and neutral feedback ratings - negative-positive type feedback composed only a
small percentage of the total feedback population.
It would be more appropriate to measure negative-positive feedback comments within
only the total positive feedback population. The prerequisite for a negative-positive
feedback is the requirement of the feedback type being positive. Within this smaller
population, negative-positive feedback composed 0.59% (2,247/382,768) of the total
positive feedback population. This was a slightly higher percent than the signature
indicator of a negative rating at 0.52%. The larger presence of negative-positive type
feedback would be consistent based on two buyer perceptions held by Nikitkov and Stone
(2006). First - a positive feedback rating from the buyer even with a negative comment
would not invite feedback retaliation from the seller. Second – the negative statement is
concealed within the feedback comment, making it a more socially acceptable and a less
drastic action than a blatant negative rating with negative comment.
Research Question 2 (RQ2)
Does the number of negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers predict
evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
The null hypothesis of The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior was rejected based
on the results from the logistic regression. The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2
(1) = 10.92, p < 0.001. As the null hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis
H2a must be accepted.
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The results of the logistic regression suggested that for every one unit increase in the
number of negative-positive feedback comments, sellers were 1.04 times (4%) more
likely to be fraudulent.
The finding of the correlation between an increasing number of negative-positive
feedback comments and an increasing probability that a seller was acting fraudulently
was expected. A similar relationship was found in prior studies by Goes, Tu, and Tung
(2009), Gregg and Scott (2008), and Pandit, Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007) with
negative feedback. These researchers noted that a single incidence of a negative rating
would normally not be sufficient to indicate that a seller was fraudulent. The presence of
multiple negative ratings increased the probability that a seller was acting fraudulently.
Research Question 3 (RQ3)
For each seller will negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers fall into a
cluster?
The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 426.18, p < 0.001. No clustering
of negative-positive type feedback was revealed for 694 sellers and 109 sellers did reveal
clustering of negative-positive type comments The expected count for each cell was
401.5 [(694+109)/2)] indicating that fewer sellers than expected had negative-positive
type comments that was clustered. The results suggested that negative-positive type
feedback comments did not fall into a cluster, therefore the null hypothesis of For each
seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not fall into a cluster was accepted.
Limitations
The major limitations of the research study were tied to three issues – fraudulent
sellers, data source, and the ability to generalize the results.
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Locating eBay sellers that were behaving fraudulently was a difficult task. The
primary source – eBay - refused to provide any type of information about why a seller
was suspended or NARU (Not A Registered User). This complicated the study by
requiring an extensive methodology to sift through and identify potentially fraudulent
sellers. An identified fraudulent seller could not be stated definitively as a fraudster, but
rather as having a high probability of exhibiting fraudulent behavior.
The second limitation was the data source. A custom web crawler was used for data
collection. A web crawler had the obvious advantages of speed, ability to extract a
massive quantity of data, and accuracy. When compared to more traditional approaches
like surveys and experiments, it did not allow the researcher to establish controls that
could have made the data a better fit for analysis. The raw public data was not as neat and
clean when compared to a survey which is designed with analysis in mind. After data
collection, considerable effort was required to convert the raw public data into a form that
could actually be utilized for analysis. Mechanisms were required in the methodology to
insure an unbiased data collection and conversion.
The third limitation was the ability to generalize the research results beyond eBay.
Because it is the 800 pound gorilla in the online auction market and has been extensively
studied by prior researchers, eBay was the logical choice. However, eBay has other
characteristics that might effect outcomes. One factor that could effect applying the
results to another online auction company is use of a different feedback mechanism. For
eBay, once the buyer or seller posts feedback it is immediately available to the other
party. Other online auctions have different feedback mechanisms. For example, a
company could prevent viewing of feedback until either both parties post feedback or the
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time allowed to post feedback has expired. This prevents either party from being
influenced by the feedback from the other thus potentially negating the issue of tit-for-tat
with negative feedback. Another limiting factor is the type of online market studied. As
eBay is an online auction, attempting to apply the results to a fixed-priced online market
like Amazon or Half.com would not be appropriate as other mitigating conditions could
be present.
Causal Direction
Correlational research design will not identify the causes or reasons for the observed
behavior. This is because a correlational relationship between variables could be the
result of an outside source. Based on this possibility, it must be understood that the
correlation does not necessarily explain cause and effect. Hence the maxim – Correlation
does not equal causation (Aldrich, 1995).
Under certain conditions, it is possible to have a high degree of confidence that there
is causality between two variables. Determining the direction of causality can be difficult
or impossible to quantify. Casual direction can be hinted if information about time is
available. This is because a cause must precede its effects under classic Newtonian
physics and natural laws. The type of data used was time-stamped historical transaction
logs which provided the ability to indicate the direction of causality.
The direction of causality was from seller to buyer. A buyer cannot provide feedback
about the item purchased or the seller until after the item is physically received. Making
the statement “Good packaging, but slow shipping” is not logical or grounded until the
package is physically in the buyer’s possession. An explicit negative feedback or hidden
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complaint using a negative-positive statement in positive feedback by a buyer would be
in response to negative or fraudulent action by a seller.
Implications and Recommendations
The research study has both theoretical and practical implications. It presented a
conceptual basis for the study of using negative-positive buyer feedback comments to
identify fraudulently behaving sellers. Empirical evidence from the study proved that
negative-positive type feedback comments do exist although they constitute 0.59% of the
total positive feedback population. Statistical analysis supported the hypothesis that there
was a correlation between negative-positive type feedback comments and a seller
behaving fraudulently. In addition, it supported a correlation between the number of
negative-positive feedback type comments and an increasing probability that a seller was
behaving fraudulently.
The contributions to knowledge were twofold. First was identifying a potential new
signature – negative-positive type feedback comments - for identifying fraudulently
behaving sellers. Second was demonstrating the use of crowdsourcing as an effective and
cost efficient means to detect fraudulent sellers in online auctions.
In January 2008, eBay made a fundamental change to the feedback system where
sellers could leave only positive or neutral ratings for buyers. That meant buyers were
free to leave negative feedback without fear of feedback-retaliation. One year after the
eBay policy was implemented, Gregg and Scott (2008) found that buyers were still
reluctant to provide negative feedback. As a contribution to the research literature, this
research study extended the work of Gregg and Scott (2008) by finding that buyers were
still reluctant even after two years to provide negative feedback.
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As potential practical contribution – the new signature combined with crowdsourcing
could be used by eBay’s Security Department for detecting potentially fraudulent sellers.
After a feedback comment is entered by an eBay buyer; it could be automatically
processed. Only a positive rating with a feedback comment would need to be evaluated.
Basic textual analysis could be performed on the feedback comment looking at syntax,
structure, and content. Only a qualified positive feedback comments would need to be
evaluated by placing an API call to AMT. The processing does not need to be real-time,
but timely updating of an eBay seller’s profile would reduce the window of opportunity
for a fraudulent seller. Although hidden from public view, the negative-positive
correlation factor when added to an eBay user’s profile could be internally used by eBay
as one more tool in identifying and monitoring potentially fraudulent sellers.
Textual analysis of the buyer feedback comments was gross and not granular. The text
contained in a positive feedback comment was evaluated in entirety as a binary negative-positive type feedback (Y) or not (N). Future research using a more detailed
data mining of the feedback comment texts could provide scalar indicators or predictors
for identifying fraudulent sellers. For example – “Good packing, slow shipping” would
be a low level indicator as a seller could live in a remote location or typically uses a slow
shipper. “Good packing, but product was not new” would be a higher level indicator of
fraudulent behavior as the seller said the product was new, but sent used.
A question that could be asked is - Can Buyer Complaint category in negative-positive
type feedback comments be used to fine tune indicators or predictors for identifying
fraudulent sellers? For future research, textual analysis of the buyer feedback comment
could be performed based on Buyer Complaint categories – product, shipping,
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communication, and other (non-specific). Each negative-positive buyer feedback
comment would be classified into one or more of the Buyer Complaint categories using a
vector like Φn = [<product>, <shipping>, <communication>, <other>]. This text mining
technique of feedback comment text has been used in prior research by Ghose, Ipeirotis,
Sundararajan (2005).
Prior studies by Goes, Tu, and Tung (2009), Gregg and Scott (2008), and Pandit,
Chau, Wang and Faloutsos (2007) used only negative feedback ratings and comments to
identify sellers as fraudulent. An interesting future study would be comparing the two
methods – negative feedback and negative-positive feedback. The proposed study would
further validate each method and provide a comparative measure of their effectiveness in
identifying fraudulent sellers. Locating fraudulent sellers for the proposed study would
need to be done independently using a grounded method like a survey of eBay buyers,
police reports, etc.
Summary
Online auction fraud represents a serious threat to e-commerce and undermines online
trust. As fraud is pervasive, growing in use, and difficult to detect in online auctions;
new techniques are needed for the early detection of opportunistic sellers. An
opportunistic seller is someone who attempts to negate online auction safeguards and
exploit buyers for monetary gain.
Understanding and identifying occurrences of online deception is critical for
increasing participation in online auctions and other forms of e-commerce, as victims of
fraud will leave the online auction market and potential new customers withhold
participation based on fear of becoming a fraud victim. Identifying online deception is
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important as deception in any form is the enemy of trust and some degree of trust is
required for all business transactions. Opportunistic sellers use deception tactics to create
an illusion of trustworthiness to the buyers’ detriment.
Reputation systems are used in online communities as normally a member has no prior
knowledge or experience interacting with another member. Unlike a traditional auction
which relies on direct reciprocity as in “I trust you because you were trustworthy with me
before.” An online auction relies on indirect reciprocity as in “I trust you because you
were trustworthy with others before.” In both cases past trustworthiness is a prerequisite
for future transactions. It is the information about reputation that enables trust by
inducing a reciprocal response.
The eBay reputation system is based on feedback provided by buyers and sellers. For
each transaction the buyers and sellers can opt to appraise the other party by leaving
feedback. Feedback consists of a positive, negative or neutral rating with an optional
short comment. Feedback score is a number used to measure a member's reputation on
eBay. A high feedback score means that a member has received a high number of
positive ratings from other members. Every member of eBay has a feedback score. Prior
research studies and third-party reports of fraud show rates substantially higher than eBay
reputation system’s reported negative feedback rate of less than 1%. The conclusion was
most buyers were withholding reports of negative feedback in fear of retaliation from the
seller.
Nikitov and Stone (2006) found that buyers sometimes embedded negative comments
in positive feedback as a means of avoiding retaliation from sellers and damage to their
reputation. The researchers surmised that these “negative-positive” feedback postings
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contained hidden signals to the buyer community about a problematic or fraudulent
seller. The composition of negative-positive feedback included both positive and negative
aspects of a transaction. Negative-positive complaints were usually in the formats of “I
was pleased with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction” or “I was unhappy about Y,
but was pleased with X for the transaction.” Typical examples are “Good product, but
slow shipping” and “Took 7 days and 2 messages before replying to my email, but
product was well packaged.”
The concept of using negative-positive feedback as a signature to identify potential
opportunistic sellers in an online auction population was never explored. This gap
provided a narrowly scoped and tightly bounded area for research with a goal of the early
detection of online auction opportunistic sellers through the use of negative-positive
feedback.
The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive
type feedback comments by buyers (independent variable) is a predictor that a seller is
behaving fraudulently (dependent variable). A correlational research design was selected
as it provided for discovering relationships between variables, measuring the degree and
direction of relationships, and from the discovered relationships predictions could be
made.
The research study implemented a correlational research design using an automated
data collection agent. The research study required the extraction and analyzing of data
that met predefined qualifying conditions from the immense eBay data sets. Manually
sifting through data sets of this magnitude was not practical due to the time and labor
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required to extract the qualified data. Instead customized software in the form of web
crawler was used to search, locate, and extract the qualified data from the eBay website.
Detection of negative-positive feedback by buyers required the examination,
interpretation, and categorization of each buyer’s feedback comment text. As natural
language communications are variable in form, subject to contextual use, can be
incomplete, and prone to errors in spelling and/or grammar; it was necessary to transpose
the relevant written text into a formatted and coded structure. A coded structure provides
data uniformity and enables automated analysis.
Contextual analysis is a systematic method for analyzing data in a standardized way.
The term textual analysis is used when contextual analysis is applied to written
communication. Using textual analysis provided a powerful and effective technique for
coding and categorizing the buyer feedback comments. Codes were used to create
categorical variables representing the original textual information. The resulting
categorical variables were analyzed using standard statistical methods.
The textual communications found in feedback comments were in natural language
format with complex overtones and subtle nuances which precluded any easy method for
representation in a coded structure. As automated textual analysis software currently have
limited capabilities and accuracy, it was necessary to use a human to make the
appropriate judgment of whether or not a feedback comment was in negative-positive
format.
The objective of the research was to determine if the presence of negative-positive
type feedback comments by buyers (independent variable) is a predictor that a seller is
behaving fraudulently (dependent variable). Identification of feedback comments by
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buyers as negative-positive or not has been addressed. Next sellers needed to be
identified as behaving honestly or fraudulently.
There are only two sources with authority that can equitably state an eBay member is
a fraudster – eBay and criminal court rulings. Due to confidentiality, eBay will not
provide any details to third-parties on complaints against a member or indicate why a
member’s account was suspended or disabled. Therefore, an explicit confirmation that a
specific online auction member was an opportunistic seller from the primary source –
eBay - was not available. As criminal court records containing formal prosecutions for
online auction fraud are very limited in number, could be sealed preventing public access
to the details or take years for a final legal verdict to be reached; they were not used.
Therefore secondary sources were used to draw inferences on a seller’s behavior as
honest or fraudulent.
Human behavior is complex and sometimes inconsistent; attempting to find a single
specific behavior pattern to signal fraudulent behavior would not be realistic. Taking a
clue from prior research into credit card fraud, online auction fraud detection is based on
looking for red flags and behavior patterns (Bhargava, et al., 2003). The mechanical
process of going through a long checklist of all the potential red flags and behavior
patterns for even a single seller would be time consuming and any lapse by an evaluator
would result in a misclassification. An automated means for making the required
judgment to classify a seller as behaving honestly or fraudulently was not available. In
order to reduce the manual labor required a software application named Auction
Inquisitor that automatically searched for red flags and suspect behavior patterns in eBay
auctions was used. Auction Inquisitor as a front end for the evaluation process provided
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the following advantages – greatly reduced the time required to review the red flags and
suspect behavior patterns for a seller; enabled the review process to be performed
consistently and without human error; and presented the results in a summarized and
standardized format.
A pilot test was performed using dedicated raters to evaluate the sellers as honest or
fraudulent and code buyer feedback comments as negative-positive type feedback or not.
Based on the results of the pilot test, the time required to process the data and estimated
labor costs were not feasible. An alternative method of crowdsourcing was tested. It
proved feasible in terms of time required to process and estimated costs. The
crowdsourcing service was provided using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
When using crowdsourcing, data quality control is a major issue as unseen, remote,
and random strangers are being asked to perform your task. First - How do you know that
the workers will have the prerequisite skills or knowledge to perform correctly the task?
Second - How do you know that the workers will actually make an effort to perform the
task rather than just randomly click on responses? These issues were addressed by using
qualification tests and data quality techniques of multiple worker assignments per HIT
(plurality), minimum work time per HIT, gold standard data, and advice of auditing.
The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback
comments by buyers are a predictor that a seller is behaving fraudulently. Three research
questions were used in framing an answer for this primary question. The result for each
research question is summarized here.
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
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Null Hypothesis (H1o): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers do not
predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Negative-positive type feedback comments from buyers
do predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
The null hypothesis H1o was rejected based on the results from the logistic regression.
The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 84.40, p < 0.001. As the null
hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis H1a was accepted. Sellers were 1.82
times more likely to be fraudulent with the presence of even a single negative-positive
feedback type comment.
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does the number of negative-positive type feedback
comments from buyers predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior?
Null Hypothesis (H2o): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments does
not predict evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): The number of negative-positive type feedback comments
predicts evaluators’ consensus of seller fraudulent-type behavior.
The null hypothesis H2o was rejected based on the results from the logistic regression.
The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 10.92, p < 0.001. As the null
hypothesis was rejected, the alternative hypothesis H2a was accepted. The results of the
logistic regression indicated that for every one unit increase in the number of negativepositive feedback comments, sellers were 1.04 times (4%) more likely to be fraudulent.
Research Question 3 (RQ3): For each seller will negative-positive type feedback
comments from buyers fall into a cluster?
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Null Hypothesis (H3o): For each seller will negative-positive feedback comments do not
fall into a cluster.
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a): For each seller negative-positive feedback comments fall
into a cluster.
The Chi-Square test was significance with Chi2 (1) = 426.18, p < 0.001. No clustering
of negative-positive type feedback was revealed for 694 sellers and 109 sellers did reveal
clustering of negative-positive type comments The expected count for each cell was
401.5 [(694+109)/2)] indicating that fewer sellers than expected had negative-positive
type comments that was clustered. The results suggested that negative-positive type
feedback comments did not fall into a cluster, therefore the null hypothesis H3o was
accepted.
The research study focused on the determining if negative-positive type feedback
comments by buyers were a predictor that a seller was behaving fraudulently. The
research had a good outcome as an exploratory study. It confirmed the variable –
negative-positive type feedback comment - as a new indicator for identifying potentially
fraudulent sellers on eBay. Multiple occurrences of negative-positive type feedback
comments by buyers increased the probability that a seller was behaving fraudulently.
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Appendix A
Methodology Overview
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Appendix B
CSV Data File Schema

For every feedback entry found in a qualified seller’s transaction history, a record will be
created. Each record will have the following format:

Data File Schema
Field Name
Feedback Number
Item Number

Field Format
6 digits
15 digits

Seller eBay Userid
Seller Feedback Score
Seller Positive Feedback
Percent
Seller Member Since
Seller Status
Buyer Feedback Type

30 characters
6 digits
5 digits
20 characters
25 characters
8 characters

Rules
Autonumber (unique)
Extracted from
Buyer Item Purchased
Can not be blank.
0 to 999999
000.00 to 100.00

Can not be blank.
Can not be blank.
NEGATIVE
POSITIVE
NEUTRAL
Buyer Feedback Comment
80 characters
Optional
Could be blank
Buyer eBay Userid
30 characters
Can not be blank.
Buyer Feedback Date
15 characters
Can not be blank.
Buyer Item Purchased
100 characters
Can not be blank.
Includes item number.
Buyer Item Cost
15 characters
Can not be blank.
Seller Reply Info
80 characters
Optional
Could be blank.
Seller Reply Text
80 characters
Optional
Could be blank.
Buyer Follow-up Info
80 characters
Optional
Could be blank.
Buyer Follow-up Text
80 characters
Optional
Could be blank.
Record Layout Continues on Next Page
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Record Layout Continued from Prior Page
↓ Data Analysis ↓
Evaluator Userid 1
14 characters Not blank
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 1
1 character
Y – Yes
N - No
Evaluator Userid 2
14 characters Not blank
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 2
1 character
Y – Yes
N - No
Evaluator Userid 3
14 characters Not blank
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 3
1 character
Y – Yes
N - No
Evaluator Userid 4
14 characters Not blank
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 4
1 character
Y – Yes
N - No
Evaluator Userid 5
14 characters Not blank
Fraudulent-Type Behavior 5
1 character
Y – Yes
N - No
Fraudulent-Type Behavior Consensus
1 character
Y – Yes
N - No
Coder Userid 1
14 characters Not blank
Negative-Positive 1
1 character
Y – Yes
N – No
Coder Userid 2
14 characters Not blank
Negative-Positive 2
1 character
Y – Yes
N – No
Coder Userid 3
14 characters Not blank
Negative-Positive 3
1 character
Y – Yes
N – No
Coder Userid 4
14 characters Not blank
Negative-Positive 4
1 character
Y – Yes
N – No
Coder Userid 5
14 characters Not blank
Negative-Positive 5
1 character
Y – Yes
N – No
Negative-Positive Consensus
1 character
Y – Yes
N – No
The data schema is not normalized. Ergo - Seller eBay Userid, Seller Feedback Score,
Seller Positive Feedback Percent, Seller Member Since, and Seller Status fields are
duplicated in each record. This has been done to make the evaluation, coding, and
statistical processing easier.
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Appendix C
Data Collection Agent

Overview of the catalog structure for organizing eBay sales items
on which the crawler will need to transverse.
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Overview of the Crawling Mechanics
1. Start up the eBay crawling program.
2. When prompted with:
Minimum feedback score to qualify seller?
3. Type in 600 and press the ENTER key
NOTE: The program will maintain and eventually print out two numbers.
- Total number of sellers found (crawled).
- Total number of qualified sellers (>= minimum feedback score).
4. Based on the structure for organizing eBay sales items, it will be necessary to
manually provide the starting point. Use the following address:
http://computers.shop.ebay.com/PC-Laptops-Netbooks-/
5. The crawler will now be at the main list of sales items.

6. Begin loop to process all sales items in the specified sales item list.
Find the next (unprocessed) sales item on the webpage.
WARNING: We have two levels of complexity for this.
Level 1 - a page can contain 1 or more sales items.
Level 2 - there can be more than one page
7. If End-of-List then:
Close the CVS ASCII data file.
Display a message:
##### total number of sellers crawled
##### total number of qualified sellers
Have a CLOSE button to close the crawler dialog window.
Terminate the program.
OR
Next sales item was found – continue to next step.
COMMENT: Basically keep looping till all sales items are processed.
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8. Go to the sales item webpage.

9. Locate eBay Seller Userid.
10. Check Sellers Crawled List – has this seller already been crawled?
If YES, then do not continue – return to step 6.
If NO, then continue to next step.
11. Increment Total Number of Sellers Found by 1.
12. Locate Feedback Score for seller.
13. Is the seller’s feedback score >= Minimum feedback score?
If NO, then do not continue – return to step 6.
If YES, then continue to next step
14. Increment Total Number of Qualified Sellers by 1.
15. Add eBay Seller Userid to the Sellers Crawled List.
16. Click hyperlink for eBay Seller Userid
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17. Begin process to gather all sales transactions for the qualified seller.

18. Locate and click on the hyperlink named See All
19. The crawler is now looking at Feedback Profile webpage for the specified eBay
Userid.

NOTE: To see the remainder of the webpage you would need to scroll down.
Now that crawler is at the appropriate screen, from this point on the program needs to
scrap/extract all the required data.
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20. First collect the eBay member’s general data.
This data will appear on every feedback record for the seller in the CSV ASCII data
file.
A Seller eBay Userid
B Seller Feedback Score
C Seller Positive Feedback Percent
D Seller Member Since
E Seller Status

21. Begin loop to scrap/extract all feedback records for the seller.
Find the first feedback transaction on the page.

22. Extract the data for the feedback transaction:
A Buyer Feedback Type
B Buyer Feedback Comment
C Buyer eBay Userid
D Buyer Feedback Date
E Buyer Item Purchased
F Buyer Item Cost
G Seller Reply Info
H Seller Reply Text
I Buyer Follow-up Info
J Buyer Follow-up Text

NOTE: This is a fully populated feedback with every optional data field being used.
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NOTE: This is a typical feedback with only the required data field.
23. Assemble the scraped off data into to a CSV (tab delimitated) text file format.
See Appendix C for detailed information on the record layout.
24. Display a message on the progress:
##### total number of sellers crawled
##### total number of qualified sellers
25. Attempt to find the NEXT feedback entry.
WARNING: We have two levels of complexity for this.
Level 1 - a page can contain 1 or more feedback entries.
Level 2 - there can be more than one page
26. If End-of-List then:
Display a message:
##### total number of sellers crawled
##### total number of qualified sellers
Go back to step 6
OR
Next item was found – Go back to step 21
COMMENT: Basically keep looping till all feedback entries are processed.
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Appendix D
Evaluator Worksheet

Evaluator Worksheet
Seller eBay Userid:
Fraudulent-Type Behavior?

No
(Honest)

Attributes of Fraud
Condition (said new was used)

Failed to ship
Incorrect color shipped
Incorrect product
Incorrect quantity shipped
Missing or damaged parts
Not genuine (copy)
Poor or badly packaged
Product not as described
Shipped late
Other: __________________

Secondary Source Comments

Other Comments

Evaluator Userid

Yes
(Fraudulent)

Comments

Deficit attributes

Secondary Sources Found

□

□ NO

□ YES

□
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Appendix E
Coding: Identifying Seller Behavior as Honest or Fraudulent
Objective
The objective of this assignment is for you to make a judgment if an eBay seller is
exhibiting fraudulent type behavior when selling to eBay buyers.
Legal Disclaimer
Inclusion of an eBay userid in this study does NOT imply that said person (or
organization) has in the past exhibited fraudulent type behavior. Nor does it imply that
said person (or organization) is currently exhibiting fraudulent type behavior. All the
eBay userids included in this research study were selected at random.
Confidentiality
Your judgment will remain confidential to ensure the integrity of the research study. For
the research report - all evaluator identifying information will be redacted in order to
protect the privacy of participating workers. For the research report - all eBay identifying
information will be redacted in order to protect the privacy of the eBay members.
Overview of the Process
In order to make your judgment, you will need to complete the following steps:
• Understand what actions constitute fraudulent type behavior.
• Review the online profile of the eBay userid.
• Search using Google for references of the eBay userid on the Internet.
• Review an analytical report on the eBay userid.
• Using the above data answer the question:
Is the seller exhibiting fraudulent type behavior?
Details for these steps will be provided below.
Estimated Time to Complete the Assignment
Making an informed judgment is a complex process and takes time.
There is no time limit – Take all the time you want to gather all the data necessary and
make your final judgments.
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What is Fraudulent Behavior?
For this research study - fraudulent type behavior will be defined as follows:
• If the seller ships an item later than agreed upon without reimbursing the buyer for
the delay, late shipping constitutes fraudulent type behavior.
• If the product differs from the item’s auction description in make, model or condition
(i.e. used vs. new), constitutes fraudulent type behavior.
• If the seller does not explicitly state that the item is not genuine (i.e. a copy),
constitutes fraudulent type behavior.
• If any deficit attributes of the product are not explicitly stated (i.e. headphones with a
six-inch cord rather than the standard three to six foot cord), constitutes fraudulent
type behavior.
• If the product is damaged in shipment due to poor packaging, constitutes fraudulent
type behavior.
• If the seller collected the buyer’s money and failed to ship the item, constitutes
fraudulent type behavior.
Instructions
1. Log on the PC with your provided evaluator userid and password.
2. Start up the Auction Inquisitor program.
3. Pull a form from the pile of sellers which you are to review.
NOTE: Forms are prefilled with Seller’s eBay Userid and Buyer Item Purchased.
4. If all the sellers have been reviewed, then logoff the computer and stop evaluating.
5. Open up a web browser using Internet Explorer or Firefox.
6. Go to the following address:
http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback-login.html
7. You should now be at the Feedback Forum: Find Member page.

8. In the white box located below eBay Users ID type in the Seller’s eBay Userid
9. Click on the FIND MEMBER button
10. You will now be at the Feedback Profile for the Seller’s eBay Userid.
Click on the FEEDBACK AS SELLER tab located at the bottom of the Feedback
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Profile.

11. You will now only see feedback comments made by buyers that purchased a product
from eBay userid Seller’s eBay Userid.
Use the PREVIOUS and NEXT options on the bottom of the Feedback Profile
screen to scroll through all the available feedback comments.

12. The What is Fraudulent Behavior? paragraph at the beginning of this document
indicated what actions constitute fraudulent type behavior for this research study.
The questions below focus these actions to assist you in the review process.
You have the OPTION of using the Evaluator Worksheet to write notes or comments
regarding the seller being reviewd.
You can see in the below picture where the find the Feedback Comment and the
eBay userid of the Buyer who wrote the comment.
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Did the seller ship an item later than agreed upon without reimbursing the buyer for
the delay?
Did the product differ from the item’s auction description in make, model or
condition (i.e. used vs. new, wrong color, marked/damaged)?
Did the seller not explicitly state that the item was not genuine (i.e. a copy) and
shipped a fake or facsimile?
Any deficit attributes of the product that were are not explicitly stated by the seller
(i.e. headphones with a six-inch cord rather than the standard three to six foot cord)?
Was the product is damaged in shipment due to poor packaging by the seller?
Do you find any other feedback from the buyer that would indicated potentially
fraudulent type behavior by the seller?
13. Secondary Reference
Open up another web browser using Internet Explorer or Firefox.
14. Go to the following address:
http://www.google.com
15. You should now be at the Google search screen:

16. Type in the eBay userid Seller’s eBay Userid
17. Click on the GOOGLE SEARCH button.
18. You are looking for secondary sources on the Internet that reference the eBay userid.
These references (if any) need to be used in making your judgment on whether or not
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the eBay userid is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior.
WARNING: The below image is only an example and should not be used to answer
the questions.

Did you find one or more secondary references using Google search?
Do one or more of the secondary references found using Google search provide
evidence that the eBay userid was exhibiting fraudulent type behavior?
19. Analytical Report
A review of the analytical report must be included in making your judgment on
whether or not the eBay seller is exhibiting fraudulent type behavior.
Next to the Seller’s eBay Userid in the form, find the Buyer Item Purchased.
The Item Number should look similar to the following format (#270523761975).
20. Switch to the Auction Inquisitor program.
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21. Type in the Item Number into the white box above the words:
Enter Auction Number or Auction URL here

22. Click on the Analyze Auction button.
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23. An analysis report will be produced looking similar to this.

24. Using the Evaluator Worksheet as a guide, review the analysis report.
25. Framing Your Judgment
Would you buy on eBay a product from this eBay seller?
Would you recommend this eBay userid as a seller to a friend?
Would you recommend this eBay userid as a seller to a family member?
26. Final Judgment
Now you need the answer the final question of:
Is the eBay seller exhibiting fraudulent type behavior?
NO - the seller is not acting fraudulently (i.e. honest behavior)
YES - the seller is acting fraudulently (i.e. fraudulent behavior).
27. Mark your judgment on the form next to Fraudulent Type Behavior?
by placing an X in the NO (HONEST) or YES (FRAUDULENT) check box.
28. Place the completed form in the “done” pile.
29. Close the Auction Inquisitor analysis window.
30. Close the web browser window.
31. Repeat the review process on the next seller - Go to step 3.
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Appendix F
Coding: Indentifying Buyer Feedback Comment as Negative-Positive
Tutorial
You will be presented with a statement to categorize.
The provided statement was made by a BUYER in response to a purchase from a
SELLER.
Your task will be to determine if the provided statement is in NEGATIVE-POSITIVE
format or not.
Key Concept
A statement in NEGATIVE-POSITIVE format contains a MINIMUM of one negative
declaration AND one positive declaration.
Constructs
Details of a simple statement's construct:
I was pleased with X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction.
Positive declaration => I was pleased with X
Negative declaration => unhappy about Y
Negative-positive statements are usually in a simple format like:
"I was happy about X, but unhappy about Y for the transaction.”
“I was unhappy about X, but was pleased with Y for the transaction.”
Examples (Positive then negative):
Good product, but slow shipment.
Great quality, but poor packaging.
Examples (Negative then positive):
Not exactly what I expected, but well packaged.
Slow delivery, but great quality.
Alternative complex NEGATIVE-POSITIVE formats use conjunctions [and, but],
prepositions [with], multiple sentences or in combination.
Examples (complex formats):
Good product and slow shipment.
Not exactly what I expected and well packaged.
Good product with slow shipment.
Poor service and good quality.
Not exactly what I expected. Well packaged.
Examples (Complex formats with multiple negative and/or positives):
Good product. Well packaged. Slow shipment.
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Good product. Well packaged, but slow shipment.
Good product. Well packaged with slow shipment.
Good product. Poorly packaged. Fast shipment.
Took 7 days to reply to my email. Slow shipment, but well packaged.
Examples that are NOT in negative-positive format:
**** (non-informational)
The weather today was beautiful. (not relevant)
Great seller! (one positive)
Shipped the wrong color! (one negative)
Good product and good shipment. (two positives)
Good product. Good packaging. (two positives)
Took 7 days to reply to my email and poorly packaged. (two negatives)
Example Question #1
Is the following statement in negative-positive format?
(123456) Good packing, but slow delivery.
O NO
O YES
Answer: YES - the statement is in negative-positive format.
Meets the MINIMUM of one positive declarative AND one negative
declarative.
Example Question #2
Is the following statement in negative-positive format?
(123457) Good product. Fast shipping. Securely packaged.
O NO
O YES
Answer: NO - the statement is NOT in negative-positive format.
Has 3 positive declarative AND 0 (zero) negative declarative.
Does NOT meet the MINIMUM of one positive declarative AND one negative
declarative.

Additional Notes
• The provided statements were made by a BUYER in response to a purchase from a
SELLER.
• The provided statements have NOT been edited.
• Natural language communications are variable in form, subject to contextual use, can
be incomplete, missing punctuation, can have errors in spelling, and/or can have
errors in grammar.
• Your task is first to interpret the provided statement as best as possible.
• Next you are to render your best judgment on whether or not the provided statement
is in negative-positive format.
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Abbreviated Example of a Coder Worksheet
Coder Worksheet
Coder Userid

123

Feedback Number
123450
123451
123452

Statement
Slow delivery, but great quality.
Not exactly what I expected, but well packaged.
Shipped the wrong color!

Answer

Instructions to Coder
1. You will be given a Coder Worksheet.
Verify that your Coder Userid matches that found on the worksheet.
In the above example – 123 is the Coder Userid.
2. Each line in the worksheet contains a statement that you will need to evaluate.
Find the first line in the worksheet that has NOT been evaluated.
If all lines have been evaluated, then STOP evaluating.
3. Read the statement in the line.
In the above example – the first line’s statement is:
Slow delivery, but great quality.
4. Is the statement in negative-positive format?
If YES, then write Y under Answer and go to step 2.
If NO, then write N under Answer and go to step 2.
NOTE
You must provide a Y or N for the Answer in every line.
Do not leave any Answer blank.

148

Appendix G
Research Qualifications Seller Test
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NOTE
The Test Method is manual rather than automatic. Approval (i.e. pass/fail) of the
worker’s test requires a manual approval by the requester.
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Appendix H
Research Prototype Seller HIT
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Appendix I
Research Qualifications Feedback Test
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Appendix J
Research Prototype Feedback HIT
With Instructions Hidden
Template: Research - coder - q1 - v1
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Appendix K
Research Prototype Feedback HIT
With Instructions Displayed
Template: Research - coder - q1 - v1
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Appendix L
Research Production Feedback HIT

Template: Research - coder - q10 - v1
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